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ABSTRACT 
 
 In both developed and developing countries, there are basically two main 
sources of economic instability: exogenous shocks and inappropriate policies. 
Exogenous shock (terms-of-trade shocks, natural disasters and capital flow 
reversals) can throw an economy into disequilibrium and therefore require 
compensatory action.  On the other hand, a disequilibrium can be self-induced by 
poor economic macroeconomic management such as an excessively loose fiscal 
stance. Therefore, economic crisis are often the result of external shocks and 
poor management. While the worlds of agriculture are vast, varied and rapidly 
changing, with the right policies and supportive investments at local, national 
and global levels, today’s agriculture offers new opportunities to hundreds of 
millions of rural poor to move out of poverty. Similarly, the construction industry 
is an essential contributor to the process of development. Roads, dams, irrigation 
works, schools, houses, hospitals, factories and other construction works are the 
physical foundations on which development efforts and improved living standards 
are established. This paper there argued that an efficient and functional fiscal 
policy can have a direct impact on the poor through the distributional 
implications of tax policy as well as public spending. However, the genuine 
reformer is distinguished by courage which is that signal that separates th e 
genuine reformer (undertaking transition) from the weak government (hoping to 
disguise itself). 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In the analysis of public sector, various types of questions may be asked. 
These questions might take the following format. What criteria should be 
applied when one is judging the merit of various budget policies; what are 
the responses of the private sector to various fiscal measures such a tax 
and expenditure charges; and what are the social, political and historical 
forces which have formed the shape of present fiscal institutions and 
which determine the formulation of contemporary fiscal policy? Here, the 
first question asks how the quality of fiscal institutions and policies can be 
evaluated and how there performance can be improved. Perhaps, the 
answer requires setting standards of “good” performance. Moreover, 
objectives of efficiency in resource use must be supplemented by 
considerations of equity and distributional justice. The second question 
must be asked if the outcome of alternative policies is to be traced. That 
is, if the rents of a corporation profits tax or of a seller tax are to be 
judged, one must know who will bear the final burden; the answer to 
which in turn depends on how the private sector responds to the 
imposition of such taxes. On the other hand, if aggregate demand is to be 
increased, one must know what the effects of the reduction in taxes or 
increased in public expenditures will be; effects which once more depend 
upon the magnitude and speed of responses by consumers and firms in 
the private sector. However, the third question is asking why the fiscal 
behavior of government is what it is. This not only is a matter of 
economics but also includes a wide range of historical, political and social 
factors. Particularly how do interest groups try to affect the fiscal process 
and how do legislators respond to such pressures; how are the fiscal 
preferences of voters determined by their income, social and demographic 
characteristics; and how does the political process serve to reflect their 
preferences? 
 Specifically, why is it that in a supposedly private enterprise 
economy, a substantial part of the economy is subject to some form of 
government direction, rather than to the “invisible hard” of market forces? 
This is because of the fact that the market mechanism alone cannot 
perform all economic functions. In other words, public policy is needed to 
guide, correct, and supplement it in certain respects it is important to 
realize this fact since it implies that the proper size of the public sector is 
(to a significant degree) a technical rather than an ideological issue 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984). To argue that the limitations of the 
market mechanism call for corrective or compensating measures of public 
policy does not prove (of course) that any policy measure which is 
undertaken will in fact improve the performance of the economic system. 
Unfortunately, public policy (no less than private policy) can also err and 
be inefficient, and consequently the basic purpose of this paper is 
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precisely that of exploring how the effectiveness of public policy 
formulation and application can be improved (with respect to revenue 
generation and allocative efficiency). Here, budget policy allocation 
function refers to the provision or social goods or the process by which 
total resource use is divided between private and social goods and by 
which the mix of social goods is chosen. The distribution function refers to 
the adjustment of the distribution of income and wealth to assure 
conformance with what society considers a “fair” or just state of 
distribution. Similarly, the stabilization function refers to the use of budget 
policy as a means of maintaining high employment, a reasonable degree 
of price level stability, and an appropriate rate of economic growth, with 
allowances for effects on trade and on the balance of payments. 
 Confronted with acute resource gaps which have over time 
impeded growth, countries have to play an even greater role in promoting 
economic development. Consequently, these countries must mobilize their 
own internal resources, which apparently imply that they adopt and 
implement effective tax polices. If well designed, taxation has the capacity 
of raising the incremental savings ration (major determinants. In other 
words, the main purpose of taxation is to raise resources to finance 
government expenditure. That is, the problem of tax design may be seen 
as one of finding a way of raising those resources which is and 
ministratively and politically feasible (and which promotes equity and 
efficiency) as far as is possible. Here, there must clearly be some trade 
offs among revenue administration, political acceptability, equity and 
efficiency (Burgess and stern, 1993). Therefore, the problem of any tax 
reform is to find an improvement with respect to these criteria, of an 
existing system. Here, we must ask whether the perceived responsibilities 
of government should be different for developing countries. In other 
words, should there be a different role for the state in these countries? 
Consequently, it may be argued that market failure is more prevalent in 
back-ward economics so that there is a greater justification for 
government intervention (such as the use of corrective taxes and 
regulatory instruments). Again, wide spread vulnerability to extreme 
deprivation may point toward state intervention. 
 However, recently, many have stressed the problems of 
government failure, associated with rent seeking, corruption, and 
inefficiency, which should be set beside those of market failure in 
assessing the desirability of government action. Thus, it may be argued 
that government failure is so severe in developing countries that the level 
of government action should be (proportionally) lower than in developed 
countries. And yet, that the very low living standards of some groups, 
missing markets and the comparative advantage of government in some 
areas (infrastructure, social sectors) provide strong arguments as to why 
the role of government should be more than minimal in developing 
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countries (Dreze and Sen, 1989). For market failure: including, notably, 
externalities, public goods, and missing markets, in addition to conditions 
leading to the violation of perfectly competitive behavior such as imperfect 
information, increasing returns and entry barriers. For poverty and income 
distribution: outcomes, whether efficient or otherwise, may be such as to 
leave some members in situations of extreme deprivation or result in a 
distribution regarded as unacceptable or unattractive. For rights to 
education, health, nutrition, and housing: many would argue that 
“equality of opportunity” implies a state responsibility to provide literacy 
and to ensure basic nutrition, health care, and shelter without which an 
individual’s participation in the economy and society are severely limited. 
For paternalism: the state may decide it has a superior view of individuals 
own self interest than individuals have themselves and further that it 
should, in some cases, override individual preferences (such as 
requirement to attend school, limitations on the use of certain drugs and 
compulsory pension schemes). For future generations: private individuals 
acting in their own self interest and that of their descendants may not 
make decisions which take the welfare or rights of future generations 
appropriately into account ( such as global  warming, air and water 
pollution, rain forests conservation, species protection, etc). 
 Indeed, all these arguments provide cogent reasons for 
government action and they point fairly directly to particular areas of 
government expenditure (notably infrastructure social security, education, 
health, pensions and environment) as well as government’s role in 
keeping the economy competitive. Here, market failure arguments are 
especially persuasive concerning infrastructure power, communications 
etc) where increasing returns, public goods and externalities can all be of 
considerable importance. Again, legal and regulatory structures ensure 
that property rights are well defined and respected, contracts enforced, 
and illegal activity contained are essential for the competitive functioning 
of the economy. And give these tasks, one has to add basic 
administration, law and order and defense. However, the identification of 
important and costly areas for government action does not by itself justify 
extensive intervention. Even in a system where government tasks are 
efficiently discharged and politics are honest and constructive, one has to 
take into account the cost of raising resources. But governments may be 
corrupt, manipulative or manipulated, and inefficient. Therefore, the 
extent of government action should be substantially limited and the types 
of measures employed by the state be designed with the problems of 
manipulation and corruption in mind. Basically, in less-developed countries 
both the difficulties of and needs for state action would appear to be 
stronger than in their industrial counterparts. Yet, in the light of the scope 
and magnitude of problems facing the developing world; and given strong 
arguments for state intervention in certain areas, resort to “government 
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failure” arguments to justify minimal state activity would appear to 
represent an unreasonable and inadequate response. Thus, the 
government call on resources is likely to be major and therefore the 
magnitude of the task of taxation likely to be substantial. Consequently, 
how is government expenditure to be financed? Basically, there are four 
main sources: government revenue, internal borrowing, and external 
borrowing money printing. 
 Empirically, governments (especially in third world countries) have 
generally been recording deficits rather than surpluses, the rising 
magnitude of which had become of concern to economists and other 
stake holders. Hence, the way government deficits are financed, taxes 
raised, and public resources allocated and utilized have important 
consequences for economic growth. In other words, large public sector 
deficits are more generally, inappropriate expenditure and revenue 
policies have been identified as an important source of the disequilibrium. 
Hence, several hypotheses had been proposed regarding the major causes 
of the phenomenon (Morrison, 1982). These include slow or stagnating 
growth of government revenue; government revenue instability and poor 
government control over expenditures. However, one major factor 
responsible for the recent increase in government deficits is the rapid 
growth in the size, variety and complexity of services provided by the 
government. In other words, there is much reliance on government to 
provide most of the needs of the people. Unfortunately, these countries 
have inadequate resources to finance their expenditure programme, given 
their limited revenue base. Thus, public borrowing as well as loans and 
grants from external sources may not be adequate. To fill this gap, the 
government is usually forced to resort to deficit financing. However, there 
is a raging controversy regarding the net effects and desirability of deficit 
financing as a tool for promoting growth and development. 
 Recently, many countries of the world tend to decentralize some 
aspects of their public finance depending on the form of mu lti-level 
government being operated. Thus the division of fiscal responsibilities 
among the tiers of government has become popular; and the demand for 
it is strong given increased efficiency. And following public choice theory, 
the general belief is that governments are no longer assumed to be 
faceless robots doing whatever economic analysis shows to be in the 
social interest. In any case, the economic efficiency rationale for the 
division of fiscal responsibilities (such as expenditures powers) can best be 
examined as concerns of supply, demand, distribution and macroeconomic 
management (Prechard, 1989). This paper therefore examines (among 
other objectives) how economic efficiency conceptually reflects the 
possibility of re-providing public goods or services so as to achieve an 
increase in the net value of ‘benefits’ provided by those goods and 
services within the corresponding jurisdiction. The rest of this paper is 
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divided into eight sections. Section two presents the taxation analysis. 
Fiscal Federalism is the theme of section three while section four 
discusses fiscal deficit. Debt management is the subject matter of section 
five and construction financing discussed in section six. A case study of 
Africa is analyzed in section eight as well as the presentation of policy 
reforms (Strategies) in section eight. Section nine concluded the paper. 
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2.0 TAXATION ANALYSIS 
 
Essentially, government derives receipt to finance expenditures, whether 
transfers or purchases, or to pay off public debt. And these receipts may 
take the form of taxes, charges or borrowing. Here taxes and charges are 
withdrawn from the private section without leaving the government with a 
liability to the payee. On the other hand, borrowing involves a withdrawal 
made in return for the government’s promise to repay at a future date 
and to pay interest in the interim. In other words, taxes are compulsory 
imposts, whereas charges and borrowing involve voluntary transactions. 
The various taxes may be classified as follows: imposition in the product 
or in the factor market, imposition on the seller’s or buyer’s side of the 
market; imposition on households and firms and imposition on the sources 
or uses side of the tax-payer’s account. Classifying our major taxes along 
these lines leaves us with the picture shown in table 2.1 
TABLE 2.1 TAXES CLASSIFICATION 
  
 
ON FIRM 
 
ON HOUSEHOLD 
 
Taxes Imposed 
As seller As Buyer As Seller 
(sources) 
As Buyer 
(uses) 
In Product 
market  
all product 
Retail sales 
tax value 
added 
(consumption 
type) 
  -   - Expenditure 
tax 
Some products Cigarette tax    -  - Gasoline  Tax 
In factor market, 
all factors, all 
employments 
           - Value added 
(income 
type) 
 Income tax     - 
Some factors all 
employments 
      - Employer’s 
payroll tax 
Employee’s  
payroll tax  
Tax on wages 
or capital 
income 
           - 
Some factors 
some 
employments 
        - Corporate 
profit tax 
local 
property tax 
           
           - 
 
       - 
Here, taxes may be imposed on the holding of wealth or stocks, rather 
than on transactions or flows generated in current production (Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 1984). Again, personal taxes are taxes which are adjusted 
to the taxpayer’s personal ability to pay, while in rem taxes (taxes on 
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“thing”) are imposed on activities or objects as such, that is, on 
purchases, sales, or the holding of property, independently of the 
characteristics of the transactor or the owner. By way of comparison, 
personal taxes (such as the individual income tax) are direct and most in 
rem taxes (such as the sales tax) are indirect. Similarly, the term “excise”, 
refers to a subcategory of indirect taxes and is applied to certain selective 
sales taxes imposed at the manufacturer level. 
 Indeed, economists and social philosophers have identified what 
constitutes a “good” tax system. The distribution of the burden should be 
equitable and everyone should be made to pay his or her “fair share”. 
Taxes should be chosen so as to minimize interference with economic 
decisions in otherwise efficient markets. Here, such interferences impose 
“excess burdens” which should be minimized. Where tax policy is used to 
achieve other objectives, such as to grant investment incentives, this 
should be done so as to minimize interference with the equity of the 
system. The tax structure should facilitate the use of fiscal policy for 
stabilization and growth objectives. Again, the tax system should permit 
fair and non arbitrary administration and it should be understandable to 
the tax payer. Administration and compliance costs should be low as is 
compatible with the other objectives. In fact, these and other requirement 
may be used as criteria to appraise the quality of a tax structure. Here, 
the various objectives are not necessarily in agreement, and where they 
conflict, tradeoffs between then are needed. Thus, equity may require 
administrative complexity and may interfere with neutrality; corrective use 
of tax policy may interfere with equity, etc. Basically, an important goal of 
tax analysis is to characterize who gains and who loses from tax reform or 
tax changes, and by how much. 
 Consequently, the benefit principle has the advantage of linking the 
expenditure and tax sides of budget policy, but it is not readily 
implemented, since consumer evaluation of public services is not known to 
tax authorities but must be revealed through the political process. 
However, it has the disadvantage of excluding redistributional 
considerations. The ability to pay principle calls for a distribution of the tax 
burden in line with the economic capacity of the taxpayer. This has the 
advantage of permitting inclusion of distributional considerations but the 
disadvantage of dealing with the tax problem in isolation with the 
provision of social goods being left out of the picture. It also calls for a 
distribution of the tax burden in line with horizontal and vertical equity. To 
obtain horizontal equity, taxpayers with equal ability to pay should 
contribute equally, and to secure vertical equity, taxpayers with unequal 
capacity should contribute correspondingly different amounts. However, 
the implementation of equitable taxation in line with ability to pay requires 
the definition of a specific index by which ability to pay is to be measured. 
Essentially, this index would encompass all forms in which economic 
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welfare is derived, including leisure as well as present and future 
consumption. Therefore, income is the most widely used general measure 
of economic capacity. Yet, an alternative measure of capacity is in the 
form of consumption. Applied as an expenditure tax, the consumption 
base may be made the basis for personal and progressive taxation. And 
given the framework of an idealized system of lifetime taxation, the 
consumption base in preferable (on grounds of horizontal equity) to the 
income base. Here, the taxation of wealth is not needed under as 
accretion - base income tax, provided that all income has been subject to 
a comprehensive income tax. In other words, holding of wealth involves a 
utility which escapes taxation under a consumption tax. Indeed, the  
determination of the proper distribution of the tax burden among unequal 
involves complex considerations of vertical equity. Thus, the principle of 
vertical equity may be formulated so as to call for equality of sacrifice. 
This may or may not require progressive taxation but separate taxes on 
income, consumption and wealth may be called for it society takes 
different views of how each should be distributed. 
 Basically statutory incidence differs from economic incidence. The 
opportunity cost of resource transfer to public use, associated with as 
increase in public services, imposes a burden on consumers as a group as 
resources are withdrawn from private use. Here, this transfer is to be 
distinguished from distribution among consumers which arises in the case 
of tax-financed transfers or tax substitutions. Owing to efficiency costs, 
employment and output effects the tax burden may exceed the revenue 
gain. Again budget incidence allows for distributional effects of both tax 
and expenditure policies. In other words, incidence involves taxation 
effects on both the sources and uses side of the household account. Here, 
an overall measure of incidence may be derived by observing the resulting 
change in the coefficient of inequality. However, the task of incidence 
theory is to trace the final burden distribution of a tax. In general, the 
imposition of the tax raises price and lower quantity. A unit tax enters 
through a parallel upward shift in the supply schedule while the advalorem 
tax enters through a downward swivel of the demand schedule. Yet, the 
magnitudes of price and quantity changes depend on the elasticities of 
demand and supply. The burden will be distributed between sellers and 
buyers in the ration of elasticity of demand to that of supply. The 
distributional impact of a product tax (progressive or regressive) involves 
both the uses and sources side of the household amount. This may be 
recessive, leaving a tax on luxuries progressive and a tax on necessities 
regressive. 
 For taxes in factor markets, the tax typically applies to the sale of 
factor services and takes the form of an ad valorem tax. This tax raises 
the gross of return to the factor while reducing factor supply and lowering 
the net rate of return. The magnitude of adjustment and distribution of 
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the burden between sellers and buyers again depends on the elasticities 
of demand and supply. Again, households are affected from both the uses 
and the sources sides of their account (but the sources side now tends to 
be decisive). Similarly, a tax on capital income tends to be progressive, 
whereas a tax on wage income tends to be regressive. The outcome may 
differ depending upon the structure of the market in which the tax 
applies. Incidence of a tax on wage income may be affected by collective 
bargaining; and a tax on executive or professional income may be shifted 
to consumers due to administered pricing. While a profit-maximizing 
monopolist cannot shift a profits tax, shifting may occur under other forms 
of market behavior. The operation of the tax system is usually costly in 
that the burden exceeds what the government gets in revenue. This 
involves costs of tax administration and compliance, as well as an excess 
burden which arises as conditions of efficient resource use are interfered 
with. Here, compliance costs by taxpayers are substantially larger than 
administration costs. A selective consumption tax interferes with the 
choice between products, whereas a general consumption tax does not. 
An income tax interferes with the choice between present and future 
consumption, whereas a general consumption tax does not. An income tax 
and a general consumption tax both interfere with the choice between 
goods and leisure. However, a partial tax on capital income distorts 
investment choices. As the rate of a tax is increased, efficiency cost 
continues to rise, but revenue reaches a maximum and then decreases. 
Yet, the excess burden impose by a progressive income tax exceeds that 
of proportional tax, as the excess burden depends upon the marginal or 
bracket rate. Choice among taxes requires allowance for both efficiency 
and equity considerations; a tradeoff has to be made where needed. 
Here, the proposition that taxes should be neutral so as to avoid excess 
burden is based on the hypothesis that taxes are introduced into an 
otherwise efficient market. The case for neutrality does not apply where 
taxes are used to correct for market imperfections in the private sector. 
However, the efficiency cost of transfers may be viewed in much the same 
way as the efficiency cost of a general income tax, with severe costs 
arising in the case of redistributive transfers. 
 The corporation tax has been of declining importance as a source 
of revenue and it covers only part of all capital income. Unlike the 
personal income tax base, the bulk of taxable profits are received by a 
small number of very large corporations. The equity of the corporation tax 
must be assessed in terms of its burden impact among individuals, not 
firms. Provided that the corporation tax will not be passed on to 
consumers or wage earners, its burden must be attributed to shareholders 
or recipients of capital income at large. Since all sources of income should 
be treated equally, this calls for integration of corporate source income 
into the personal income tax. Indeed, general sales taxes may be based 
 12 
on gross national product or consumption. Selective tax may be designed 
to serve as benefit taxes, to discriminate against demerit goods or to be 
imposed on readily available transactions. Sales taxes may be single or 
multiple-stage. Single-stage taxes may be imposed at the manufacturing, 
wholesale or retail level. On the other hand, multiple-stage taxes may be 
of the turnover or value added variety. Specifically, value-added taxes 
(VAT) may be of the consumption or income type. A consumption- type 
value-added tax is equivalent to a retail sales tax on consumer goods; and 
the value-added approach offers administrative advantages as well as 
disadvantages. The regressive nature of the sales tax arises because it 
falls on consumption and consumption as a percentage of income declines 
when moving up the income scale. Here, regressivity may be reduced by 
exemption of food and progressivity may be introduced by the granting of 
a credit against income tax. While the value-added tax is simply a sales 
tax administered in a multistage form, a personalized and progressive 
expenditure tax would be a genuinely new form of taxation. Such a tax 
could be more consumption taxation from its traditional regressive form 
into the progressive range. Again, wealth may be taxed on an in rem basis 
as under the property tax or on a personal basis as under the net worth 
tax; and the net worth tax may be used as a corrective to imperfect 
taxation of capital income under the income tax. The local property tax 
serves as a rough approximation to ability-to-pay taxation. Under 
competitive conditions, such a tax is equivalent to a tax on all capital 
income. As such its burden distribution is progressive, except for the lower 
end of the income scale. If the supply of capital is elastic, the longer-run 
adjustment to the tax may involve sharing of the burden by wage earners 
and consumers of capital intensive products such as housing. The part of 
the tax which is imposed on residential property may be viewed as a tax 
on housing consumption and which suggests is regressive burden 
distribution. For owner occupied residences, part of the tax is absorbed in 
imputed rent and for rental housing, imperfect markets may place part of 
the burden on tenants. 
 As an alternative form of wealth taxation, the tax may be imposed 
in personal form and be applied to net worth only. Such a tax may be 
applied on a person’s global net worth with exemptions and progressive 
rates similar in spirit to the income tax. As distinct from the property tax, 
the base would include all assets, intangible as well as tangible, but 
liabilities would be deducted. To be effectively implemented, such a tax 
would have to be national rather than local in scope. Conventionally, the 
structure of death duties includes an estate tax at the federal and 
inheritance taxes at the state level. Though limited in revenue importance, 
death duties are a significant instrument of social policy. Since passage of 
wealth through bequests is one of the major factors in the concentration 
of wealth holding, death duties are a suitable instrument by which to 
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modify the distribution of wealth. They are also an effective instrument by 
which to implement society’s attitude toward the passage of property 
rights at death. However, different types of death duties will serve 
different objectives and the choice among them poses an important policy 
problem. Essentially, the pay roll tax is collected from the employer 
(including the contributions of both employer and employee) the latter’s 
being with held at the source. Since the tax is on gross earnings and as 
allowance is made for exemptions, the employee need not be required to 
file a return. However, the self-employed must file a return since there 
can be no source withholding. Like the rem tax (imposed on wage income 
and readily subjects to withholding) the payroll tax is an administratively 
ideal tax. While both are subject to withholding, the upper limit of taxable 
wages remains set on a global basis because over withholding may be 
credited against individual income tax. However, if more than one 
member of a family is in covered employment and subject to tax, the 
secondary earner may choose between his or her separate claim and the 
benefits due him or her under the spouse’s claim. As in all incidence 
analysis, the outcome here, differs depending on the market structure in 
which the payroll tax is imposed indeed, the question remains, whether 
the payroll tax should be viewed as just one among other taxes. 
Conventionally, payroll taxes were thought of as contributions for the 
purchase of insurance benefits, that is, retirement income and 
unemployment compensation. Thus, the equity of the system was viewed 
in terms of net benefits received, rather than in terms of the tax burden 
only. Assuming an assignment of individual benefits in line with individual 
contributions and considering the net impact on lifetime incomes, the 
distributional results of the scheme would be neutral. Consequently, many 
observers has the view that social security benefits should not be 
considered in insurance terms, but as an expenditure program forming 
part of an overall policy of income maintenance to be provided for (like 
other expenditure) out of general tax revenue. Thus, the payroll tax may 
be judged like any other tax, independent of the benefit side of the social 
security system (Aaron, 1982 and Brittain, 1972). 
 Indeed, when the social security system was first established, one 
option was that the old would go without benefits, since they had not 
contributed, while those working would begin to contribute so as to earn 
future benefits. Since contributors would become eligible only at 
retirement, contributions would initially exceed benefit payments. Thus, it 
would be necessary to build up and invest a reserve which at the later 
date would yield an interest income. This income, in conjunction with a 
constant tax rate, would pay for the benefits. In this way, each generation 
would pay for its own benefits, with the initial generation of retirees 
remaining out of the system. The alternative was to treat those already 
retired (as well as early retirees) as if they had contributed during their 
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working lives. Under this system, the initial generation of retirees would 
be given a gift by those still in the labor force. But the latter would be 
compensated when, at the time of their own retirement, they would be 
supported by the contributions of their children, who by then had moved 
into the labor force. Essentially, the basic premise underlying a social 
security system is that generations are willing to engage in a social 
contract. In other words, the working generation of today assumes the 
responsibility of supporting today’s retirees, on the assumption that it in 
turn will be supported by the subsequent generation of workers. 
 Normative tax theory uses a combination of positive theory on the 
effects of tax changes, together with ethical criteria for the evaluation of 
the effects to appraise changes in the tax system. This argument involves 
a balancing of the economic criteria of efficiency, equity and revenue 
(Burgess and stem, 1993). Specifically, optimal tax theory combines 
economic criteria into a single objective and finds the best tax system 
subject to the various constraints. Usually, the expressed using a social 
welfare function, which itself depends on the utility or real income of 
households. If one household gains and no others lose, then the social 
welfare function (SWF) shows an improvement. In other words, SWF 
incorporates a tradeoff between efficiency and equity. Explicitly, the 
function usually takes the form 
  W (u
1
, u
2
, …..,u
h
,…..,u
H
). (2.1) 
Where U
h
 is the utility of household h. Here, a transfer of income Dy from 
household 1 to 2 would therefore change welfare by 
 (B
2
 –B
1
) Dy (2.2) 
Where B
h
 is the social marginal utility of income of household h. 
It is often helpful to think of distributive value judgments in terms of 
specification of the Bs. 
However, many of the problems of developing countries involve growth 
and change. Consequently, we may ask whether the theories of growth 
and taxation can be combined to provide useful insights into the role of 
policy in growth. Yet, we know much less about the dynamic behavior of 
individuals and there are important problems which arise for dynamic 
models and dynamic optimizing models are less tractable than static ones. 
The static theory of optimal taxation allows a dynamic interpretation if we 
view goods produces or consumed at different time as different goods. To 
the problem of apply and extending static models to a dynamic 
framework, must be added those issues which are intrinsically new when 
we pass to the dynamic from the static. These include: incorrect 
expectation; the development of knowledge; revision of policy and 
credibility; influence of future generations; pensions and intergenerational 
transfers; whether the tax base should be consumption, income or wealth, 
and the process of adjustment.  
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 In most countries, tax evasion is rife. The effect of evasion 
activities can be to drive a wedge between the statutory and effective tax 
systems to the point that the revenue that is legally due bears little 
relation to that collected. In other words, taxation is a strange, 
unwelcome, and sometimes incomprehensible concept to many people of 
the world. Differences in the tradition of compliance probably explain as 
much of the worldwide pattern of taxation as do under – resourced or 
poorly organized tax administrations. Thus, the success or failure of 
systems of taxation (such as VAT) depends on the level of voluntary 
compliance as well as enforcement. That is, very few like paying taxes but 
the hostility to taxation and the propensity to evade depend on cultures as 
well as economic incentives. Here, problems of information and 
measurement imply that individual income taxation is particularly valuable 
to noncompliance. Tax evasion is not limited to income taxes, rather sales 
taxes and excises are evaded in many ways. A popular method is under 
invoicing and the problem seems to be particularly severe in the service 
sector, where clients are often presented with an option (a higher fee if 
tax is to be declared, and a lower one if the transaction is to go 
unreported. 
 Next, we illustrate the application of applied general equilibrium 
techniques by focusing on early small-dimensional general equilibrium tax 
modeling by Shoven and Whalley (1972) and Shoven (1976). These 
modeling analyses were a continuation of Harberger (1959, 1962, and 
1966). The early harberger model is a two-factor, two sector, general 
equilibrium model in which a tax applies to the use of one factor (capital) 
in one sector. However, the model solves using servers of approximations 
and local linearization assumption. Yet, an empirical distinction is made 
between heavily and lightly taxed sectors. 
The model assumes that each sector employs two factors, capital services 
and labor, in the production of homogenous outputs. These sectors are 
referred to as the “corporate” and “unincorporated” sectors, owing to the 
major role played by the corporation income tax in causing these 
differential tax rates. However, the sectoral distinction does not exactly 
correspond to the legal distinction between incorporated and 
unincorporated enterprises. In order to estimate the efficiency loss due to 
differential taxation of return to capital, the model applies a form of 
welfare analysis in the tradition of Marshalian producer surplus. 
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3.0 FISCAL FEDERALISM 
Federalism can be defined as the theory of advocacy of federal political 
orders where final authority is divided between sub-units and the centre. 
It consists of a series of legal and administrative relationship established 
among units of government, possessing varying degrees of real authority 
and jurisdictional autonomy. 
   Conventionally, two processes of federalism are identified one process 
involves the coming together of independent states to cede or pool 
sovereign powers in certain domains for the sake of goods otherwise 
unattainable (such as security or economic prosperity). On the other 
hand, another process is evolution from a unitary set-up, where 
federations develop from unitary states as government’s response to 
alleviate threats of secession by territorially clustered minorities in the 
latter arrangement; particular domains of sovereignty are granted to sub-
units while maintaining broad range of actions for the central government 
and majorities. In other words, a federal government is a constitutional 
arrangement which divides law-making powers and functions of the state 
between two or more levels of government which are coordinated in 
status. Therefore, fiscal federalism is concerned with how to establish 
which level of government has the authority to impose and administer 
taxes. Also, it has to do with determining which government should 
administer and retain what proportion of revenue actually realized from 
taxation. Consequently, fiscal federalism attempts to grapple with the twin 
question of socio-economic disparities among the component units of the 
federal system, economic growth, stabilization and development of the 
whole federation (Oyovbaire, 1985). 
 
 Indeed, political history tells much in explaining the structure of 
fiscal arrangement in any one country. Taking each of the three major 
functions (allocation, distribution and stabilization) of government, we 
consider how the nature of fiscal arrangements changes in the context of 
a federation. Allocation theory as applied to the public sector has led to 
the belief that public services should be provided and their costs shared in 
line with the preferences of the residents of the relevant benefit region. 
And given the fact that a political process is needed to secure preference 
revelation, it follows that particular services should be voted on and paid 
for by the residents of the region. In other words, services which are 
nationwide in their benefit incidence should be provided for nationally; 
services with local benefits should be provided for by local units; and still 
 17 
others should be provided for on a regional basis. Given the special 
characteristics of social goods, there is therefore an apriori case for 
multiple jurisdictions; and each jurisdiction should provide services the 
benefits of which accrue within its boundaries (i.e. by using only such 
sources of finance that will internalize the costs. Consequently, the 
spatially limited nature of benefit incidence calls for fiscal structure 
composed of multiple service units, each covering a different sized region 
within which the supply of a particular service is determined and financed.  
 Essentially, economic analysis suggests that provision for social 
goods proceed through a multi-jurisdictional setting, with national goods 
provided centrally and local goods provided on a decentralized basis. 
However, members of the federation may feel a stronger sense of 
distributive justice regarding members of their own constituent unit than 
regarding members of the federation at large. Here, the stronger is the 
sense of cohesion within the federation, the more will the problem of 
distribution be viewed in national, federation-wide terms; and the less it 
is, the more will distribution be viewed within the context of the member 
jurisdiction only. If they are to be effective, policies aimed at adjusting the 
distribution of income among people, must be conducted primarily at the 
central or national level. Thus, decentralization reduces the capacity to 
undertake redistributional policies (with resultant implications). Again, 
redistributive measure among jurisdictions occurs in the context of grants 
designed to equalize the terms at which local public services are supplied, 
calling for transfers from high-need, low-capacity jurisdictions to high-
capacity, low-need jurisdictions. Yet, since the use of income is enjoyed 
by individuals and not jurisdictions, it would seem that the issue of 
distribution (as a problem is social policy) should relate to distribution 
among individuals and not among jurisdictions. However, redistribution 
among jurisdictions may be desirable, if only on second best grounds. 
Where central policies to adjust distribution among individuals on a 
federation-wide basis are deficient, redistribution among jurisdiction may 
serve as a substitute. Thus, grants made to poor jurisdictions may be 
expected to provide public service benefits to low-income people. Fiscal 
capacities among jurisdictions differ because low and high income 
individuals tend to separate in distinct communities. Consequently, some 
jurisdictions are caught in the vise of low tax base and high fiscal need. 
Thus low income residents in these communities suffer lower service 
levels while high-income residents will have to pay higher taxes than they 
would elsewhere. Therefore, a transfer to such jurisdictions might then 
serve to equalize both positions, as it will permit higher service levels with 
lower local taxes. Again, national policies may cause fiscal burdens to fall 
upon particular jurisdictions, calling for compensation from other units in 
the federation so as to spread the burden. Schemes of interjurisdictional 
transfers may therefore be appropriate policy measures, even though 
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fuller central assumption of responsibility for redistributional measures 
among individuals would be the better solution. 
Similarly, it should be noted that the inter-juridictional equalization is 
frequently a price demanded by weaker jurisdictions for entry into the 
federation. 
 It is pertinent to note that the responsibility for stabilization policy 
has to be at the national or central level. Here, lower levels of government 
cannot successfully carry on stabilization policy on their own. However, in 
a closely knit federation, member jurisdictions will exist as completely 
open economies within the national market, with free factor and market 
mobility; and they will thus share in federation wide swings in economic 
activity, inflation and unemployment. Yet, in a fiscal policy setting, local 
fiscal measures will be ineffective as they meet with large import 
leakages; and these leakages do not arise if such fiscal measures are 
undertaken at the national level. Similarly, central banking policy is 
inherently a national function; and not only would decentralized  monetary 
policy be seriously blunted in its effectiveness by the openness of the 
regional economy, but the power to print money would invite monetary 
irresponsibility at the state or local level. Consequently, the necessary 
degree of fiscal coordination is not likely to emerge in a decentralized 
setting, so that central responsibility for stabilization action is required. At 
the same time, central government responsibility for stabilization policy 
must account for the needs of state and local government. Thus, levels of 
spending and taxing at the lower levels of government may be influenced 
by the central government’s stabilization policy. Essentially, central 
banking policy affects the availability and cost of credit for state and local 
government, and grants to lower-level units may be varied depending on 
cyclical conditions. 
 Basically, the ability of a jurisdiction to carry out its fiscal tasks (its 
fiscal position) depends on its tax base (its capacity) relative to the outlay 
required for rendering public services (its need). When jurisdictions with 
relatively high capacity are faced with low needs, their fiscal position is 
strong. Here, a standard level of services can be provided with a low 
ration of tax revenue to tax base (a low-tax effort). In other words, 
standard level of tax effort will generate a high service level relative to 
need (high fiscal performance). Where the opposite holds, a high effort 
may be needed to provide only a substandard performance level. 
Specifically, the various concepts are related to each other as presented 
below. First, we define the fiscal capacity of jurisdictions j or Cj as  
C
j
 = t
s
B
j
 (3.1) 
Where B
j
 is the tax base in J; t
s 
is a standard tax rate j and c
j
 measures 
the revenue which j would obtain by applying that rate to its base. Next, 
we define the fiscal need of jurisdiction j or N
j
 as  
           N
j
 = n
s
Z
j 
 (3.2) 
 19 
Where Z
j
 is the target population (such as number of school-age children); 
n
s
 is the cost of providing a standard service level per unit of Z, such as 
instruction per child; and N
j
 measures the outlay in j required to secure a 
standard level of performance or service. Next, we measure the fiscal 
position of j or P
j
 as  
         P
j
 = C
j
/N
j
 = t
s
B
j
/n
s
Z
j
        (3.3) 
Here, fiscal position equals the ration of capacity to need and setting p for 
jurisdictions on the average equal to I, a value of Pj > I, implies a strong 
fiscal position and a value of P
j
 < I, a weak fiscal position. The value of P 
is the index to which distributional weights in grant formulas should be 
linked and we may define jurisdiction j
s 
tax effort E
j
 as 
              E
j
 = t
j
B
j
/t
s
B
j
 = t
j
/t
s
 (3.4)   
Or the ration of actual revenue in j obtained by applying j
s
 tax rate t
j
 to 
what would be raised by applying t
s
. Next, we define the performance 
level M as 
                       M
j
 =n
j
Z
j
/n
s
Z
j
 = n
j
/n
s 
(3.5) 
Or the ratio of actual outlay obtained by applying j’s outlay rate n
j
 to that 
required to meet the standard level at the rate n
s
. 
Assuming a balanced budget, we have  
           T
j
B
j
 = n
j
Z
j
                             (3.6)  
By substituting from (3.6) into (3.3) we obtain an alternative definition of 
fiscal position: 
               P
j
 =     n
j
/t
j
                   (3.7)  
                         n
s
/ t
s 
               
Thus, fiscal position may be defined as the ratio of capacity to need as in 
(3.3) or as the ratio of performance to tax effort as in (3.7). These 
concepts and problems which arise in comparing fiscal position both 
among states and among jurisdictions within states) pose one of the 
principal issues in fiscal reform. Essentially, they are of concern both to 
the federal government (called upon to reduce excessive differentials 
among states) and to the state governments (called upon to deal with 
excessive differentials among local jurisdictions).  
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4.0 FISCAL DEFICITS 
Basically, fiscal deficit measures must be specified over three dimensions: 
deficit has to be defined for a public sector of a given coverage; the 
coverage or size of the public sector and its composition must be 
delineated; and the time-horizon relevant for assessing the magnitude of 
the deficit must be identified (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991). In the absence 
of standardized accounting rules for government, the conventional deficit 
is not well defined. Consequently, two main areas of variance are 
distinguished as follows: the distinction between the items that determine 
the deficit (income and outlays) and the items that finance it (drawing the 
line); and specification of the time at which the resource use is measured 
(cash versus accrual deficit). Though the conventional deficit measure 
exists in competing versions, all versions have at least one characteristic 
in common: in calculating the budget balance, they include (with the 
same weight) all government transactions. However, policymakers have 
(from time to time) calculated alternative measures of the deficit, with the 
aim of highlighting the differential impact of various budgetary 
transactions on important macroeconomic variables. Thus, the main types 
of special-purpose deficit that have been fairly widely calculated are the 
current deficit; deficit measuring the contribution of different transactions 
to aggregate demand; domestic deficit; structural (cyclically) adjusted 
deficits, primary deficit and operational deficit. 
 Generally, the conventional deficit measures the difference 
between public investment and public saving. In order to isolate public 
(dis) saving, the current deficit calculation omits investment outlays and 
capital revenues such as asset sales. In other words, the current deficit is 
the difference between non capital revenues and expenditures. Since 
different elements of government expenditure and revenue generate 
different net increases to, and withdrawals from, demand, policymakers 
attempt to isolate in the deficits measure, the government’s contribution 
to aggregate demand. Here, tax-financed transfers such as pensions and 
unemployment benefits merely redistribute purchasing power from one 
part of the private sector to another. In terms of their impact on 
aggregate demand, they are akin to negative taxes rather than to 
government’s expenditure on goods and services (Buiter, 1983). The 
domestic deficit is measured by including in the calculation only those 
budgetary elements that directly affect the domestic economy. The 
foreign deficit (impact of the budget on the balance of payments) can be 
measured by including only budget transactions directly connected to the 
external sector (Chelliah, 1973). Indeed, when the public sector has 
sizeable trade or capital flows to and from the rest of the world, the 
overall deficit measure can be particularly misleading. Specifically, 
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devaluation may cause the budget deficit to widen if government imports 
or foreign debt service are large, suggesting an expansionary fiscal policy 
(though resources injected into the economy by government remain 
unchanged or may even fall). While the budget deficit affects aggregate 
demand, aggregate demand also affects the budget deficit. Thus, income 
tax revenues will usually be lower and benefit transfer higher when 
unemployment in high. In other words, the budget deficit is affected by 
the business cycle and the impact of discretionary policy changes may 
differ depending on at which stage of the business cycle they are 
implemented. Basically, there are two main classes of “permanent” or 
long-run deficits. The full-employment deficit (or structural balance) was 
derived in the belief that a small surplus in that budget would ensure a 
high level of national saving while permitting built-in fiscal stabilizers to 
damp cyclical fluctuations. Therefore, the cyclically adjusted or trend 
budget balance was developed to provide a budget balance rule that 
would maintain a constant level of public liabilities. In other words, the full 
employment deficit can be defined as the cyclically adjusted balance when 
the national product reference trend selected is potential output (muller 
and price, 1984). 
 Although the structurally adjusted deficit is sometimes presented as 
measuring the impact of discretionary government policy, it includes an 
important nondiscretionary variable, namely, interest payments on the 
stock of public debt (which is usually predetermined by the size of 
previous deficits). Here they primary deficit (or non interest deficit) 
attempts to measure the discretionary budget stance by excluding net 
interest payments from the budget. It could also reflect the success of 
polices in moving the economy towards a sustainable growth path. 
However, the interest bill is beyond the control of current fiscal policy, not 
only because it represent the cost of previous deficits, but also because 
monetary policy can affect interest rates and hence budgetary interest 
payments. Again, inflationary fluctuations can significantly change the size 
of government nominal debt service. Besides its distortionary effects on 
real revenues and its effects on the real value of government assets and 
liabilities; inflation, while reducing the real value of the outstanding stock 
of unindexed public debt, may compensate creditors for such erosion in 
their real assets through higher nominal interest rates. In other words, 
some of the government’s interest payments on its debt are in reality part 
of the amortization of that debt (Tanzi, 1977). If the inflationary 
component of interest rates is not removed from the interest bill, the 
deficit will be overstated by the size of the amortization element included 
debt outstanding and with its terms and denomination . Consequently, an 
alternative suggested to alleviate the problem is the operational deficit, 
which omits the inflation-induced portion of interest payments from the 
deficit calculation; that is, it is defined as the primary deficit plus the real 
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component of interest payments. Essentially, the operational deficit 
excluded inflation induced interest payments on the assumption that they 
are similar to amortization payments in their effects on the economy (that 
they do not represent new income to recipients) and are willingly 
reinvested in government bonds, at existing market conditions; and 
therefore they do not affect the level of aggregate demand in real terms. 
On the other hand, real interest payments can be consumed without 
reducing a bondholder’s net wealth, and thus have an expansionary 
impact similar to any other type of expenditure. However, if inflation were 
to reduce the real demand for bonds, then, in an economy with 
accelerating inflation, inflation-induced interest payments would not be 
fully refinance able under existing market conditions but would require 
either higher real interest rates or higher bond liquidity, thus increasing 
demand pressures. Therefore, the operational deficit measure excluding 
the inflation component of interest payments would then underestimate 
the degree of fiscal imbalance. 
 Indeed, the classical economists have argued that deficit financing 
negatively affects private investment and believe that debt issued by the 
public sector adds to, competes with, the private sector demand for 
saving. This perception is based on assets market theory where the supply 
and demand for government securities reduces its prices and raises 
market interest rates. Here, interest rates are bid up, causing a crowding-
out of some productive private investments and the excessive deficit 
financing can lead to stagnant or declining economic growth (Zahid, 
1988). However, the Keynesian doctrine stresses the short-run positive 
effects but de-emphasized the potentially adverse long-run effects of 
deficit financing on investment and growth. In an economy with rigidity in 
wages and price structures, the Keynesians regard deficit financing as an 
important tool for achieving a level of aggregate demand consistent with 
full employment and price stability. In other words, whenever debt is used 
to finance government expenditures, consumer income would be 
increased. On the other hand, the neoclassical and monetary economists 
contend that the Keynesian doctrine does not fully take into account the 
displacement of private spending by taxation or borrowing required to 
finance government expenditure (as this will dampen the extent of the 
effect of the Keynesian multiplier on the economy). Unlike the Keynesian 
framework, the neoclassical macroeconomic models suggest that the 
method employed to finance public expenditure programmes will affect 
the levels of consumption, investment and net exports. Again, such 
models assume that aggregate consumption is higher, and national saving 
lower, if a given spending programme is financed by bonds issue rather 
than taxation (Yellen, 1989). 
 And given the limitations of neoclassical exposition, Ricardian 
equivalence is the label attached to the alternative view of the relationship 
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between deficit financing and growth. This view perceives deficit spending 
as the harbinger of neither good nor ill. In other words, the logic of the 
Ricardian Equivalence is that if the public is fully aware of the future tax 
implications of debt financing (and inter-generational transfers are a 
major motive for savings) then any increase in government debt would be 
matched by any equal increase in current savings, with no impact on 
domestic interest rates. Thus, deficit spending cannot be expected to 
offset fluctuations in economic activity nor can it be held responsible for 
high interest rates or large trade deficit (Barro, 1989; Darrat, 1989). This 
thesis suggests that the impact of a given programme of government 
spending is independent of its mode of financing and it is believed that 
rational consumers would base their consumption decisions on life-time 
income, which depends on the present value of government expenditure 
rather than on the timing of tax collections. Basically, the contention is 
that rational economic agents interpret government deficits as postponed 
tax liabilities and thus will have no effect on private wealth or interest 
rates. Yet, there is another contention that any attempt to correct deficits 
by raising taxes will merely cause more spending without any positive 
effect but increase the size of the public sector in the long run. 
Consequently, it is not possible to generalize the expected impact of fiscal 
deficits across economies. 
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5.0 DEBT MANAGEMENT EXTERNAL RESERVES 
Basically, there are three main methods of deficit finance, namely: finance 
through money creation (inflationary financing), finance through sales of 
government securities (non-inflationary domestic financing), and finance 
through external borrowing (non-inflationary external financing). Here, 
money creation is differentiates from others in that it does not lead to any 
increase in a stock of debt; and often labeled inflation tax. However, since 
the debt incurred by government if it chooses to finance deficits through 
sale of government securities and external borrowing, will carry interest 
charges, the net contributions of such financing to long-term deficit 
financing is less than the gross contribution. Thus, the eventual 
consequence of dependence on these methods may be a need for a rise in 
conventional or inflation tax revenues. Essentially, there are five sub-
divisions of methods of finance through sales of government securities; 
reserve requirements on banks and other financial institutions; required 
purchase of government bonds by banks at controlled interest rates; 
required purchases of government bonds by banks at market interest 
rate; credit rationing in the presence of controlled interest rates; arrears 
of government payments (Roe and Grigg, 1990). 
Indeed, the connection between the direct sources of the government’s 
financing and the real balance of deficit financing as between domestic 
and external source, follows the national accounting identity namely: 
           S
f
 = (I
g 
– S
g
) + (I
p
 – S
p
)  (5.1) 
Where the subscript S
g
 and p indicate government and private, 
respectively; S is saving and I is investment. Here, either an increase in I
g
 
or a reduction in S
g
 will raise the equilibrium interest rates at which total 
domestic investment is financed. Low interest absence of administrative 
controls will elasticities and the certainly imply larger movements of 
interest rates in this situation than will high elasticities but the direction of 
interest-rate movements is uncertain. Specifically, if the net foreign assets 
(liabilities) of a country are ignored, the consolidated balance sheet of its 
banking sector is given by: 
 
              DC
p
  +  DC
g
 = M (5.2) 
And 
             DC
p
/ P
y 
 + DG/PY = M/PY (5.3) 
 
Where Dc is domestic credit; M is money supply; and PY is the nominal 
value of GDP (gross domestic product). If the demand for real money 
balances is a negative function of the inflation   (    ) as in the equation  
           Md/P =  Ø e - ∂            (5.4) 
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And if we suppose that all the revenue from the inflationary tax accrues to 
the government, then in any given year those revenues (R) in real terms 
are given by: 
   R/p =        (Øe -∂   )              (5.5)  
Where Ø and ∂ are numerical parameters to be estimated. 
  
 Domestic public debt is a product of government borrowing to 
finance its budget deficits. Critically, the major factors responsible for the 
growth of the domestic debt have been the need to provide deficit finance 
to the government. Recently, these types of the securitized domestic debt 
have become diversified with the number of instruments rising 
tremendously. These include treasury bills, treasury certificates, treasury 
bonds and development stocks. Development stocks are floated largely to 
provide development finance, either directly to meet the needs of the 
federal government or as loan on-lent to state governments. On order to 
meet developmental needs, the tenor of the maturities is usually long-
term (varying between five and twenty-five years). 
 Foreign borrowing allows a country to invest and consume beyond 
the limits of current domestic production and (in effect) finance capital 
formation not only by mobilizing domestic savings but also by tapping 
saving from capital surplus countries. However, inappropriate and 
excessive foreign borrowing will generate debt service obligations that will 
constrain future economic policy and growth. Therefore, the objective of 
debt management policy is to achieve the benefits of external finance 
without creating difficult problems of macroeconomic and balance of 
payments stability. Global capital markets allow enterprises and 
governments in capital scarce countries to borrow from capital abundant 
countries, where the market interest rate is lower. In effect, world capital 
markets increase the interest that lenders in the capital abundant 
countries can earn and reduce the interest paid by borrowers in the 
capital – scarce countries. Thus, international lending can increase 
economic welfare in both the borrowing and lending countries. For capital-
scarce countries, this means expansion of capital formation and higher 
optimal borrowing (Klein, 1994). Definitionally, gross external debt is the 
amount at any given time, of disbursed and outstanding contractual 
liabilities of residents of a country to non residents to repay principal, with 
our without interest, or to pay interest, with or without principal. Here, 
gross debt is the stock of liabilities, on which debt service is calculated. 
That is, Net debt comprises assets less liabilities. A contractual liability is 
an obligation to make payments to an agreed schedule and equity 
participation is excluded. Principal, with or without interest means that 
interest-free loans are included in the core definition, and interest, with or 
without, principal includes loans of indefinite maturity (perpetual bonds). 
Disbursed and outstanding means that debts includes only committed 
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amounts drawn-down, not yet repaid, or cancelled and it does not include 
future interests payments. Here, undisbursed amounts are excluded as 
well as the exclusion of “frame agreements” under which agreed-upon 
loan contracts are to be concluded in the future. In fact, only when loan 
contracts are signed and drawn down do they become part of gross 
external debt. Usually, external debts are owed to nonresidents and 
residency is defined in relation to a territory, which comprises the general 
government, individuals, private non profit bodies, and enterprises 
(defined in terms of their relationship to the territory of that economy. 
 External debt records relate to stocks (amounts outstanding at any 
particular time) as well as flows (transactions in a defined period). Stock 
concepts are disbursed and outstanding debt, undisbursed balances, and 
arrears of principal (plus interest). On the other hand, flow concepts are 
loan commitments received, disbursements, amortization payments, 
interest payments, debt cancellation, debt write-offs, and amounts 
restructured. Disbursed debt outstanding is the outstanding balance of a 
loan and it is equal to the cumulative disbursements, less repayments, 
amount cancelled and amounts restructured. Undisbursed balance is the 
amount of a loan committed but not yet disbursed. The arrears of 
principal and interest are the cumulative amount of debt service payments 
due but not yet paid. Commitments are the sum that the creditor has 
agreed to lend. Disbursements are the amount of a loan that is utilized in 
the accounting period interest is the amount paid to the lender during the 
amounting period as compensation for use of his capital. Amortization is 
the principal repaid during the designated accounting period. The total 
debt service payments are the sum of amortization and interest payments. 
Cancellations are the annulment of undisbursed loan   balances. Write-offs 
are the annulment of disbursed debt. Restructurings are the amount of 
principal or interest payment due but deferred, rescheduled, refinancing 
or exchanged as a result of debt-restructuring agreement; and these may 
be rescheduling or debt- exchange arrangement. Here, debt relief as debt 
cancellation is treated as a write-off. 
 Consequently, some key relationships can be derived from the 
above definitions. The available funds from a loan at any moment of time 
are equal to the original loan commitment amount plus any 
supplementary commitments, minus total disbursements and cancellations 
to date. This sum is often referred to as the “pipeline” of finance and each 
loan record should show this relationship overtime. At the end of any time 
period, the stock of debt is equal to the stock of debt at the end of the 
previous time period, plus disbursements, minus amortization, principal 
rescheduled, write-offs during the period. Pre-scheduled principal involves 
a transfer of the amount from the original loan to a new loan and arrears 
of interest on long-term debt are shown separately, as part of the short-
term debt. The loan commitment value is the sum of disbursed debt plus 
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the undisbursed balance and it is equal to the loan commitment value less 
write-offs, cancellations, amortization and rescheduled principal. The 
arrears in total debt service at the end of any period equals the arrears in 
total debt service at the end of the pervious period plus the debt service 
scheduled  to be paid, but minus debt service paid, in the period. Here, 
arrears must be recorded separately for principal, interest and other 
charges. 
 Essentially, there are two possible ways of grouping debt data: 
borrower type and creditor type. Among borrowers, the direct debt of the 
central government should be shown separately and within private sector 
debt, it is useful to identify separately debt that is guaranteed by the state 
(as such debts are in effect contingent budgetary liabilities). Creditors can 
first be broken down into official and private lenders; and official creditors 
can be multilateral or bilateral lenders. Private lenders are commonly 
grouped into bond holder, commercial books, suppliers and others. A 
cross-creditor scheme often used is export credits and private export 
credits consist of supplier’s credits and buyers credits. Table 5.1 gives a 
detailed classification of debt-related flows while table 5.2 shows an 
international investment classification scheme (Klein, 1994).  
 
 
TABLE 5.1 DEBT-RELATED FLOWS: CLASSIFICATION DETAILED 
 
MATURITY: SHORT-TERM (One-year or less) 
     LONG-TERM (More than one year) 
 
FLOW TYPE: DISBURSEMENTS 
             INTEREST PAYMENTS 
                   AMORTIZATION  
                   RESTRUCTURING  
                   CHANGE IN ARREARS  
 
BORROWER TYPE: GOVERNMENT (DIRECT DEBIT) 
                               PUBLIC ENTERPRISES  
                               OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR  
                                                 PRIVATE SECTOR: PUBULIC- 
                                      GUARANTEED  
                                      NON GUARANTEED 
 CREDITOR TYPE:   OFFICIAL: MULTI LATERAL 
 BILATERAL 
      PRIVATE: BONDS 
      COMMERCIAL BANKS 
      SUPPLIERS 
      OTHER PRIVATE 
 28 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.2 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CLASSIFICATION 
SCHEME 
1. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
a. Equity Capital and reinvested earnings 
i. Claims on affiliated enterprises 
ii. Liabilities to affiliated enterprises 
b. Other Capital 
i. Claims on affiliated enterprises 
ii. Liabilities to affiliated enterprises 
 
2. PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 
a. Equity Securities 
i. Monetary authorities 
ii. General government 
iii. Banks 
iv. Other sectors 
b. Debt securities  
i. Bond and Notes 
1. Monetary authorities 
2. General government 
3. Banks  
4. Other sectors 
ii. Money-market instruments 
1. Monetary authorities 
2. General government 
3. Banks 
4. Other sectors 
iii. Financial Derivatives 
1. Monetary authorities  
2. General  Government 
3. Banks 
4. Other sectors 
3. OTHER INVESTMENT 
a. Trade Credit 
i. General government 
1. Long-term 
2. Short-term 
ii. Other Sector 
1. Long-term 
2. Short-term 
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b. Loans 
i. Monetary authorities 
1. Long-term 
2. Short-term 
ii. General government  
1. Long-term 
2. Short-term 
iii. Banks 
1. Long-term 
2. Short-term 
iv. Other sectors 
1. Long-term 
2. Short-term 
c. Currency and deposits 
i. Monetary authorities 
ii. General government 
iii. Banks 
iv. Other sectors 
4. OTHER ASSETS 
a. Monetary authorities 
i. Long-term 
ii. Short-term 
b. General government 
i. Long-term 
ii. Short-term 
c. Banks 
i. Long-term 
ii. Short-term 
d. Other sectors 
i. Long-term 
ii. Short-term 
 
5. RESERVE ASSETS 
a. Monetary gold 
b. Special drawing rights 
c. Reserve positions in the fund 
d. Foreign exchange 
i. Currency and deposits 
1. With  monetary authorities  
2. With Banks 
ii. Securities 
1. Equities 
2. Bands and notes 
3. Money-market instruments and financial derivatives 
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e. Other claims  
 
Ideally, foreign borrowing enables a country to invest or consume more 
than would have been possible for her own resources. In fact, all is well if 
export earnings grow rapidly and provide the foreign exchange from 
which ever increasing principal and interest payments can be met. But, if 
debt service obligations grow faster than foreign exchange earnings, that 
country may develop balance of payments difficulties. Consequently, the 
standard approach in assessing debt servicing capacity is to construct an 
economic model for projecting the balance of payments over a period of 
time. Consider a closed economy, where there is no foreign trade and 
production consists of goods and services for consumption or investment. 
Here, consumption good (c) can be for the government or the private 
sector and investment goods (I) comprise buildings, plant and equipment 
and inventories used by enterprises; investment, too, is either by the 
government or private enterprises. Thus, the production relationship can 
be represented by a simple equation. 
  Y (t) = C (t) + I (t) (5.6) 
  C (t) = Cp (t) + (Cg (t)  (5.6A) 
 I (t) = Ip (t) + Ig (t)  (5.6B) 
The (t) designates a discreet time period while the subscript (p) and (g) 
tell us which sector of the economy, private, government respectively is 
consuming or investing. Again, a minor image of the production 
relationship is the income relationship, and because production crates 
incomes equal to the value of outpour (Y). Here, some income is taken by 
the government as taxes (T); some is saved by the private sector (Sp); 
and the balance is spent on consumption (Cp). We can therefore 
represent this relationship as equation (5.7): 
 
 Y (t) - T(t) = Cp(t) + Sp(t)   (5.7) 
 
Combing equation (5.6), (5.6A) and (5.7) we have 
 
Cp (t) + Cg(t) +I(t)= Cp (t) +Cg (t) +Sp(t) +T(t)  (5.8)  
 
Simplifying and combining terms, we have 
 
I(t) =Sp(t) +(T(t)-Cg(t)) (5.8A) 
 
Equation 5.8A shows that, in a closed economy, investment is equal to 
private savings and public savings (measured by government tax revenue 
minus government current expenditures. In equation (5.6) we add a term 
for exports (x), showing production of goods and services that are sold to 
nonresidents; and in equation (5.7) we add a term for imports (IM), 
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showing the utilization of income for imported goods and services. By 
modifying equations (5.6) and (5.7) and their combination in (5.8), we 
arrive at equation (5.8B). 
That is, 
 Y(t) =C(t) + I(t) + X(t)  (5.6
1
) 
        Y (t) = Cp(t) +Sp (t) + T(t) + IM(t) (5.7
1
) 
 
Cp(t) +Cg (t) + I(t) + X(t) =Cp(t) +Cg(t) +Sp(t) +T(t) +IM(t) (5.8
1
) 
 
Resulting to: 
 
   I(t) = Sp (t) + (T(t) –Cg(t)) + (IM(t) – x(t) (5.8
B
) 
 
The implication of (5.8B) is that imports can exceed exports only if 
financing is available and this financing may be in grants or direct 
investment or foreign exchange reserves. Alternatively, imports can 
exceed exports only to the extent that foreign loans and credits can be 
negotiated. Unlike equation (5.8B) let [I(t)] represent the average interest 
rate charged on external debt in period (t) and let [D(t)] represent the 
stock of debt as of some point in time. Thus, interest on external debt can 
be represented as:  
 
I(t) *  D (t-1) (5.8c) 
 
The growth of debt during the year (t) can be represented as:  
 
D(t) –D(t-1) = i(t) * D(t-1) + [IM(t)- X(t)] (5.9) 
 
If we divide both sides of the equation by [D(t-1)], then the left side 
represents the growth rate of external debt [d(t)]. The equation then 
becomes: 
 
D(t) =I (t) + [IM(t)- X(t)]/ D(t-1) (5.9A) 
 
Indeed, equation (5.9A) highlights the factors that make debt grow faster 
or slower (that is, larger or smaller values of [d(t)]. Here, [d(t)] will be 
high if the average interest rate [I(t)] is high or if the noninte rest current 
account deficit [IM(t) – X(t)] is high relative to the stock of debt of the 
previous period  [D(t-1)]. Again, the size of the stock of debt is crucial (as 
with a larger debt stock) larger interest payments are required. And yet, 
the fundamental factor causing debt to rise is the reliance on external 
resources to finance capital formation. 
Empirically, World Bank (1992) developed a method of projecting 
development prospects, external borrowing requirements and debt 
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servicing capacity for all countries to which the bank lends. In other 
words, a common approach has evolved over the past three decades: this 
conventional version is known as the revised minimum standard model 
extended (RMSM-X). It has four sections: RMSM –X (projection) module, 
historical data file. The basic model separates economic activity into the 
public, private, financial and foreign sectors. Yet, a central feature of the 
RMSM-X is its reliance on flows-of-funds accounting. Expenditures (uses) 
by one of the four sectors also comprise receipts (sources) by the other 
three sectors. The flows-of-funds accounting distinguishes between 
current and capital transactions. For each sector, current income minus 
current expenditures is defined as savings or the net accumulation of 
wealth. Here, savings is entered twice as a use of funds in the current 
account and a source of funds in the capital account as shown in table 5.3 
(Klein, 1994) 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.3 FUNDS SOURCES AND USES: MATRIX SCHEME 
Current 
Account 
Central 
Government 
Private 
Sector 
Monetary 
Sector 
Foreign 
Sector 
Production 
Account 
Total 
Sources 
Central 
Government 
 Direct Taxes 
Non Tax 
revenue 
Profit and 
losses 
Transfers 
current 
grants 
Indirect 
Taxes 
subsides 
Total 
Private 
Sector 
Transfers 
Interest on 
bonds 
 Profit and 
losses 
interest on 
demand 
and time 
deposits 
Transfers 
workers and 
profit 
remittances 
GDP at 
factor cost 
Total 
Monetary 
Sector 
Interest on 
credit 
Interest on 
Credit 
 Interest 
receipts  
 Total 
Foreign 
Sector 
Interest on 
foreign debt 
transfers 
Interest on 
foreign debt 
profit 
remittances 
transfers 
Interest 
on foreign 
debt 
 Imports 
exports 
Total 
C & S 
Account 
Consumption 
savings 
Consumption 
savings 
Savings Savings  Total 
Central 
Government 
 Bonds 
Capital 
Revenue 
Change in 
monetary 
credit 
Foreign 
credit grants 
ADJ WRT 
INT ADJ 
WRT INT 
ADJ WRT 
Savings Total  
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PRIN 
Private 
Sector 
Capital 
Transfers 
 Change in 
monetary 
credit 
Foreign 
credit DFI 
ADJ WRT 
INT ADJ 
WRT PRIN 
ERCORS 
and 
Omissions 
Foreign 
Credit  ADJ 
WRT INT 
ADJ WRT 
PRIN 
 
 
Savings  Total  
Monetary 
Sector 
 Change in 
Money 
holdings 
  Savings  Total 
Foreign 
Sector 
  Change in 
foreign 
reserves 
 Savings Total 
Investment 
Account 
Investment Investment    Total 
Total uses Total Total Total Total total  
 
As the RMSM-X model is used for projection purposes in countries which depend 
on external finance, one must not only project the debt flows of the pipeline debt 
but must make provision for new borrowing. Assumptions must be made of 
autonomous borrowing and related assumptions must be made also on the 
disbursement paths that these loans will take. Some variants of the model will 
allow domestic financial disequilibrium to spill over into residual borrowing (gap 
fill) and the type of credits used to close the gap must be specified. 
Again, the model will calculate credit-worthiness, ratios and their projected 
values will indicate the plausibility of the scenario that results from the economic 
relationships and external borrowing possibilities that the user specifies. 
Specifically, the model does consider the consequence of complex debt 
restructuring scenarios or adjustments to the currency composition of the debt 
and these assumptions are worked out in another projection framework (debt 
strategy module, DSM) and the results are then fed into the RMSM-X 
calculations. 
 Indeed, an important aspect of debt management policy is to control the 
risk of external price fluctuations. In other words, a borrowing country’s balance 
of payments is subject to shocks from three types of price changes that cannot 
be controlled by domestic economic policies. These include exchange rate 
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fluctuation, interest rate fluctuations and commodity prices. It is therefore 
possible to protect the balance of payments from wide savings in these prices by 
hedging. Essentially, hedging provides insurance against price risks which take 
the form of substantial unanticipated fluctuations. Such exposures call for better 
risk management, that is, the use of financial techniques to minimize adverse 
changes in future net cash flows arising from changes in external prices. 
However, financial techniques of risk management are sophisticated and when 
they are used in appropriately, there can be serious losses. It is therefore 
important that people develop a solid knowledge of international commodity, 
foreign exchange and financial markets and that there is also an appropriate 
institutional framework.  
 Conventionally, reserve is defined as money or its equivalent kept in hand 
or set aside usually to meet liabilities. Specifically, for external reserves, it is the 
liquid resources (assets readily converted into cash) of a nation for meeting 
international payments. In other words, foreign exchange reserves can be 
referred to as the liquid assets held by a country’s government or central bank 
for the purpose of intervening in the foreign exchange market. Clearly, the 
external reserves of a country are the financial assets available to the 
government to meet temporary imbalance in the external payment; to intervene 
in its foreign exchange market in defence of its exchange rate; and to settle 
obligations arising from international trade, financing contracts, diplomatic 
relations and so on (Rasheed, 1995; Tella, 2007). Basically, a number of items 
constituted the external reserves of a country and these include mainly gold, 
foreign, currencies (note and coins), special drawing rights (SDRs) and the 
Reserve Tranche at the International Monetary Funds (IMF). Other items include 
balances payable on demand held with financial institutions abroad, bills of 
exchange and promissory notes denominated in foreign currencies, treasury bills 
issued by foreign governments, and marketable securities issued or guaranteed 
by foreign government or international financial institutions. Here, the type of 
assets held, where they are held and in what form give an indication of the 
principles followed by the country’s foreign exchange management. It is 
important to note that a large proportion of the assets must be held in liquid 
form and should be readily available for settling the country’s international 
transactions. The foreign exchange in excess of immediate requirement for 
transactions should be invested in interest bearing securities which are 
marketable and likely to appreciate in value but can be liquidated without much 
capital loss; and the assets must be held with reputable and credible financial 
institutions for safety purposes. In other words, the purpose of holding reserves 
is to allow central banks an additional means to stabilize the issued currencies 
from excessive volatility and protect the monetary system from shocks. Reserves 
are also used as a precautionary purpose to provide a cushion to absorb 
unexpected shocks or a sharp deterioration in their terms of trade or to meet 
unexpected capital outflows. Usually, external reserves are managed to ensure 
that they are adequate for meeting a range of defined national objectives 
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including the settlement of external obligations as scheduled and defence of the 
external value of the domestic currency to ensure that it is correctly valued and 
that the external sector does not lose competitiveness. They are also managed 
to control risks and thus ensure the security of reserves and guarantee 
reasonable earnings from their placement. For instance, the World Bank’s 
Reserves Advisory and Management Program (RAMP) is both technical advisory 
program designed to build capacity in reserves management as well as asset 
management engagement allowing the world Bank to manage, for a fee, a 
portion of the external reserve of member Central Banks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.0 CONSTRUCTION FINANCE 
Indeed, the construction industry is an essential contributor to the process 
of development. This is because of the fact that roads, dams, irrigation 
works, schools, houses, hospitals, factories and other constructions works 
are the physical foundations on which development efforts and improved 
living standards are established. Improving construction capacity and 
capability is therefore important to most developing countries in the 
world. This is because of the fact that the extensive basic infrastructures 
built up at high cost in earlier years, have now to be maintained; and it is 
generally expensive  (if not impossible) to bring foreign contractors back 
again for this type of work. Again, there is need to improve on the 
efficiency, timeliness and quality of construction and maintenance work in 
many developing countries of the world. Essentially, the construction 
sector has two main classes of products: building (associated with 
housing, offices, hospital, factories) and civil works (involving 
infrastructure for water supply, transport, irrigation, power generation, 
etc). Ideally, construction activity is characterized by two important 
features. Its demand is subject to considerable fluctuations that can have 
serious repercussions on the utilization of resources and construction does 
not depend on a single technique of production. Here, there is usually a 
wide range of factor combinations (capital and labor) that can be tailored 
to suit each finished product (Word bank, 1984). Both areas can be 
influenced by economic measures: the former through planning and 
demand management and the latter through pricing policies which 
encourage the use of the most economic factor combinations. 
 The fluctuations in construction activity, relative to those of other 
sectors, tend to be greater in developing than in developed countries. If 
national policies succeed in stabilizing the economy, they would stabilize 
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demand for the construction industry. The twofold role of the government 
(as policymaker at the macroeconomic level and as an originator of 
demand and executor of works at the microeconomic level) stresses its 
importance for the sector. Through the timing of its investments, the 
government can influence fluctuations in demand for construction. In 
other words, the governments overall economic polices and specific 
industry related regulations can have a profound influence on investment 
decisions of the private construction sector. Here, backward linkages can 
have widespread impact because much of the raw, semi processed and 
processed materials can be provided by relatively unsophisticated labor 
intensive domestic sources and by basic industries such as cement and 
steel manufacturing. On the other hand, forward linkages affect practically 
all other sectors of the economy. These linkages, combined with a high, 
value added-to-output ratio, indicate that construction provides a 
substantive growth stimulus throughout the economy. Its importance as 
an agent of development is enhanced by it ability to provide gainful 
employment for a large number of workers. Much of the demand for labor 
is often net by taking unskilled workers from rural areas, which can 
subsequently be trained for more demanding jobs.  
 Critically, the main inputs in construction are management, 
personnel, equipment, materials and capital. The relative importance of 
these inputs varies from job to job for civil and building constructions and 
also depends on the choice of technology. However, the government’s 
influences are felt strongly on both the supply and demand sides of 
construction. The actions include policies and legislation affecting licenses 
and permits, sanitary and building codes, minimum wages corporate 
taxes, rules on the importation of materials and spare parts, and the 
terms and availability of financing for construction, sound policies on 
interest rates and taxation (including provisions for investment and 
allowances on depreciation) could spread out the demand for 
construction. But construction tends to be undertakes when financial 
resources become available, this adds to inflationary pressures caused by 
constraints on construction capacity and shortage of materials. Yet one 
possible measure that can be considered by governments to stimulate 
construction is the establishment of a countercyclical credit policy which 
can create a reserve fund in period of high demand to be released  for 
investment during economic down turns. Again, in an internationally 
financed work, domestic contractors are often at a disadvantage because 
they have to bid on the basis of equipment for which they have paid full 
import duties, while foreign firms pay no such duty. Yet, as approach to 
this problem would be require that foreign contractors pay duty on the 
amount that the equipment depreciates over the contract period. Full duty 
could be collected at the time of importation and the balance calculated 
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on the residual value at the end of the contract, refunded upon  re-export 
of the equipment. 
 However, in principle, construction services should be procured 
with the aim of achieving economy and efficiency in countries that are 
developing a domestic construction industry, this long term objective must 
be reconciled with the shorter-term goal of providing a financial 
advantage to the employer, considering the capacity of domestic 
entrepreneurs to manage risk. Generally, procurement practices should be 
fair and lead to contracts that adequately protect the rights and sti pulate 
the obligations, of both parties. Here, fair bidding procedures are a means 
for establishing good procurement practices and the preferred method is 
that of awards made to the lowest evaluated bid received from pre-
qualified bidders. For the larger tenders, prequalification is an involved 
process, devised with the specific characteristics of each project in mind. 
For smaller tenders, which a government calls at frequent intervals, and 
which normally attracts local bidders, it is preferable to maintain an up-to-
date classified register of contractors, setting up categories of firms by the 
size of contract they can undertake. Such a permanent prequalification 
system must be linked with a good flow of information regarding the 
ongoing commitments of the bidders; must be based on readily verifiable 
information; and the system for updating must be simple (easy to operate 
with scarce resources). Again, governments use various methods to foster 
domestic construction enterprises through the contracting process. 
Foreign bidders are often required to have local participation of a certain 
minimum percentage. Similarly, parastatal construction enterprises are 
given direct access to contracts at noncompetitive prices. Because 
negotiated contracts usually result in the payment of a premium by the 
contracting authority, they need to be used with great care and some 
legislation explicitly forbids them. 
 Indeed, the quality of supervision affects (in particular) small 
enterprises that cannot afford the means to provide a high degree of 
quality control and therefore, must reply on the client’s supervision. In 
fact, defective workmanship or materials (if not corrected at an early 
stage) may later require extensive reconstruction forcing the contractor 
into incurring no recoverable extra costs. In particular, there are cases 
where the client’s supervision has been weak or deficient, or where the 
client has not been able to cooperate with an inexperienced contractor. In 
places where the construction industry is at as early stage of 
development, supervisors may have to provide a consideration amount of 
technical assistance. In practice, the smooth implementation of 
construction contracts requires the appointment of a trusted resident 
engineer with full authority being given to resolve onsite construction 
problems. However, shortage of engineers, surveyors, estimators, 
foremen, equipment operators, and other skilled workers hampers the 
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ability to do a large volume of work to acceptable standards of 
workmanship. Thus, important opportunities exist for the bank and 
governments to assist the industry in overcoming widespread deficiencies. 
Table 6.1 shows the range of skills required for three typical construction 
operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.1 TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS: REQUIRED SKILLS 
RANGE 
 
Personal Level Labor-intensive gravel 
Road Construction 
Building 
Construction 
Hydro Power Scheme 
Skill Labor Masons: Equipment 
operations of 
mechanics 
Masons: 
carpenters, 
electricians, 
Plumbers, joiners  
Masons: Electricians, 
plumbers, welders, fitters, 
steel erectors, equipment 
operations, drillers, powder 
men, electricians 
 
 
Technical 
Personnel 
Foremen: pay clerks, 
engineers  
(Double up as 
surveyor), construction 
Engineer 
Foremen, pay 
clerks, cost 
accountants 
(estimator or 
quantity 
surveyor), 
construction 
engineer 
Specialist foremen: general 
foremen, pay clerks, 
Accountants; cost 
accountants, estimators, 
surveyors, structural 
engineers, electrical 
engineers, mechanical 
engineers, construction 
engineers, geologists, drug 
HTSMEN, Laboratory 
Technicians, inspectors, 
equipment superintendents, 
services superintendents, 
camp superintendents  
Management Engineers (doubling up Engineer or Project Manager; 
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Personnel for technical function) Architect (usually 
doubling up for 
technical 
function) 
administration Manager; 
General Manager 
 
Clients in general (and government in particular) can have a direct 
influence on contractors’ finances in two areas: advance payments and 
regular payment procedures. Advance payments must be set to meet the 
bonafide initial cash requirements of the contractor and this should be 
done in a way that will enable the contractor to mobilize his resources 
promptly and avoid a heavy financial charge and unbalanced prices (front -
end loading). Here, a system that provides for prompt payment of 
contractors invoices is the best form of financial assistance which the 
industry can have. Delayed payment are an enforced and expensive form 
of suppliers’ credit, which only produce difficulties to the client who may 
have to face contractual problems or pay higher costs. Bonds and 
guarantees are normally written by banks, financing houses, and 
insurance companies. They can also be established through a cash deposit 
made by the contractor or through deductions made from his regular 
payment certificates. They equally serve to assure the client of the 
contractor’s performance and ensure that the contract will stand by his 
price or forfeit the bond. Nevertheless, guarantees are a form of insurance 
cover for the owner and are essential in construction contracts. Yet, in a 
more complex environment, it may be possible to establish a central 
clearing house for “construction paper” linked to the commercial banking 
system; and this can be done in a way which would redistribute risk and 
financial exposure, possibly through the establishment of a fiduciary role 
in contracts for public and private construction. 
 Again difficulties in the supply of materials and machinery (main 
physical resources used in construction) may be caused by shortages of 
foreign currency, transportation and importation problem, and protection 
of inefficient local manufacturers. They can seriously affect the efficiency 
or even the continued viability of a domestic construction industry. While 
construction work can normally proceed by using substitutes for finishing 
materials, the lack of fuel, aggregate, timber, cement, steel, and asphalt 
can have an immediate paralyzing effect. Again, equipment and tools pose 
challenges that center on the freedom of choice the construction 
enterprise has on the flow of spare parts through the customs. 
Procurement based on political or protectionist considerations is another 
problem and often, contractors are obliged to buy locally produced 
equipment, vehicles, and tools, construction equipment must therefore be 
tough and reliable and have an assured supply of spare parts to ensure 
continuity of operations and cost efficiency. 
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7.0 AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT 
From both historical and contemporary cross-section perspective, the 
agricultural transformation seems to evolve through at least four phases 
that are roughly definable (Timmer, 1988). The process starts when 
agricultural productively per worker rises and this increased productivity 
creates a surplus, which in the second phase can be tapped directly, 
through taxation and factor flows or indirectly, through government 
intervention into the rural urban terms of trade. Here, this surplus can be 
utilized to develop the nonagricultural sector; and for resources to flow 
out of agriculture, rural factor and product markets must become better 
integrated with those in the rest of the economy. The progressive 
integration of the agricultural sector into the macro economy (via 
improved infrastructure and market equilibrium linkages) represents a 
third phase in agricultural development. When this phase is successful, 
the fourth phase emerges. That is, the role of agriculture in industrialized 
economies is little different from the role of the steel, housing or 
insurance sectors. But when the integration is not successfully 
accomplished (and most countries have found it extremely difficult for 
political reasons) governments encounter serious problems of resource 
allocation and even problems beyond their borders because of pervasive 
attempts by high-income countries to protect their farmers from foreign 
competition. In other words, managing agricultural protection and its 
impact on world commodity markets thus provides a continuing focus for 
agricultural policy makers even when the agricultural transformations is 
“complete”. 
Indeed, the four phases in the agricultural transformation call for 
different policy approaches. In the earliest stage of development, the 
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concern must be for getting agriculture moving (Mosher, 1966). Here, a 
significant share of a country’s investable resources may well be extracted 
from agriculture at this stage but this is because the rest of the economy 
is so small; and direct or indirect taxation of agriculture is the only 
significant source of government revenue. Building a dynamic agriculture 
requires that some of these resources be devoted to the agricultural 
sector itself; and these resources need to be allocated to public 
investment in research and infrastructure as well as to favorable price 
incentives to farmers to adopt new technology as it becomes available. As 
these investments in agriculture begin to pay off, the second phase 
emerges in which the agricultural sector becomes a key contributor to the 
overall growth process through a combination of factors (Johnston and 
Mellor, 1961). However, as structural patterns of growth emphasizes, 
there is a substantial disequilibrium between agriculture and industry at 
this early stage of the development process (Kuznets, 1966). Yet, 
differences in labor productivity and measured income between the rural 
and urban sectors persist to the present in rich countries, although the 
gap is narrowing and now depends on agricultural prices for any given 
year. Therefore, the process of narrowing the gap gives rise to the third 
environment for agriculture, in which it is integrated into the rest of the 
economy through the development of more efficient labor and credit 
markets that link the urban and rural economies. This integration is a 
component of the contribution process; improved functioning of factor 
markets merely speeds the process of extracting labor and capital from 
those uses in agriculture with low returns for those in industry or services 
with higher productivity. Here, the improved markets have welfare 
consequences and they lessen the burden on individuals trapped in low-
income occupations. However, the gain has costs. As agriculture is 
integrated into the macro economy, it becomes much more valuable to 
fluctuations in macro prices and level of aggregate activity and trade; and 
much less susceptible to management by traditional instruments for the 
agricultural sector, such as extension activities and specific programs for 
commodity development and marketing (Schuh 1976). This vulnerability 
and complexity create the fourth phase in the agricultural transformation 
(the treatment of agriculture in industrialized economies). 
Actually, the debate over the role of agriculture in the process of 
economic development extends at least as far back as the physiocrats in 
the eighteenth century. Specifically Clark (1940) provided the general 
facts about the role of agriculture during the growth process available to 
economists and planers at the beginning of the drive for economic growth 
in the developing countries. These facts formed the basis for the 
prevailing neoclassical view that agriculture was a declining sector (black 
box) which contributed labor, food, and perhaps capital to the essential 
modernization efforts in industry. Here, no policy efforts on behalf of 
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agriculture’s own modernization were needed because the sector declined 
naturally. Thus, it is easy to see why agriculture was neglected as a 
source of growth in early strategies of economic development. Historical 
record shows that it always declines in relative importance in glowing 
economies and it is the home of traditional people, ways and living 
standards (antithesis of what nation builders in developing counties 
envisioned for their societies). Again, agriculture was thought to provide 
the only sources of productivity that could be tapped to fuel the drive for 
modernization. Surplus labor, surplus savings and surplus expenditures to 
buy the products of urban industry and even surplus foreign exchange to 
buy the machines to make them, could be had from an uncomplaining 
agricultural sector. In fact, nothing more was needed to generate these 
resources than the promise of jobs in the cities and a shared nationalistic 
pride in the growing power of the state. Unfortunately, the unique 
features of agriculture as a sector were not simply understood in the 
1950s; nor was it accepted that the development of a modern agriculture 
was necessary as concomitant to development of the rest of the economy. 
However, Johnston and Mellor (1961) listed five roles for agriculture in 
economic development. Increase the supply of food for domestic 
consumption; release labor for industrial employment; enlarge the size of 
the market for industrial output; increase the supply of domestic savings; 
and earn foreign exchange. All these five roles are equally important and 
agriculture in the process of development is to provide increased food 
supplies and higher rural incomes to enlarge markets for urban output, as 
well as to provide resources to expand that urban output. 
Indeed, the process of economic development is one of continuous 
redefinition of the roles of agriculture, manufacturing, and services. In 
light of the evolving role of agriculture in fostering growth and reducing 
poverty, countries can be classified as agriculture – based, transforming or 
urbanized, based on the share of aggregate growth originating in 
agriculture and the share of aggregate poverty in the rural sector (world 
bank, 2008). Here, three clusters of structurally different economies 
emerge and each with distinct challenges for agricultural policymaking. In 
agriculture based economies, agriculture contributes significantly to 
growth and the poor are concentrated; and the key policy challenge is to 
help agriculture play its role as an engine of growth and poverty 
reduction. In transforming economies, agriculture contributes less to 
growth but poverty remains overwhelmingly rural. In urbanized economies 
agriculture contributes only a little to growth and poverty is no longer 
primarily a rural phenomenon. Here, poverty is no longer primarily rural 
phenomenon and agriculture acts like any other competitive tradable 
sector and predominates in some locations Also; agriculture can reduce 
the remaining rural poverty by including the rural poor as direct producers 
and by creating good jobs for them. However, there is no unique route for 
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a country to more from an agriculture-based to an urbanized and 
eventually to a high-income country. Essentially, the above three country 
types capture the major distinguishing features in the role of agriculture 
for growth and poverty reduction across countries and provide useful 
framework to focus the discussion and help formulate broad policy 
guidance. 
Specifically, biofuels offer a potential source of renewable energy 
and possible large new markets for agricultural producers. But few current 
biofuels programs are economically viable and most have social and 
environmental costs; upward pressure on food prices, intensified 
competition for land and water, and possibly; deforestation. With oil prices 
near an all-time high and few alternative fuels for transport, several 
countries are actively supporting the production of liquid biofuels (ethanol 
and biodiesel). As a renewable energy source, biofuels could help mitigate 
climate change and reduce dependence on oil in the transportation sector. 
They may also offer large new markets for agricultural producers that 
could stimulate rural growth and farm incomes. Yet, on the downside are 
environmental risks and upward pressure on food prices. These impacts, 
which depend on the type of feedstock (raw material), production 
process, and changes in land use, need to be carefully assessed before 
extending public support to large-scale biofuel programs. Though 
developed countries are leading in ethanol production, new players are 
emerging. Today, many developing countries are launching biofuel 
programs based on agricultural feedstock, biodiesel from palm oil; ethanol 
from sugarcane; biodiesel from oil-rich plants, such as jatropha, 
Pongamia, and other feedstock. Ideally, government should provide 
substantial support to biofuels so that they can compete with gasoline and 
conventional diesel. These supports include consumption incentives (fuel 
tax reductions), production incentives (tax incentives, loan guarantees, 
and direct subsidy payments) and mandatory consumption requirements. 
However, the breakeven price for a given biofuel to become economical is 
a function of several parameters. Here, the most important determining 
factors are the cost of oil and the cost of the feedstock which constitutes 
more than half of today’s production costs. 
Unfortunately, rising agricultural crop prices from demand for 
biofuels have come to forefront in the debate about the potential conflict 
between food and fuel. For example, the grain required to fill the task of a 
sport utility vehicle with ethanol could feed on person for a years, so 
competition between food and fuel is real. Thus, rising cereal prices will 
have an adverse impact on many food-importing countries. Even in the 
short term, higher prices of staple crops can cause significant welfare 
losses for the poor (most of whom are net buyers of staple crops). But 
many poor producers could benefits from higher prices. However, future 
biofuels technology may rely on dedicated energy crops and agricultural 
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and timber wastes instead of food crops, potentially reducing the pressure 
on food crop prices and contributing to the supply of more 
environmentally friendly supplies of liquid biofuels. But technology to 
break cellulose into sugars distilled to produce ethanol or gasify biomass is 
not yet commercially viable; and some competition for land and water 
between dedicated energy corps and food crops will likely remain. 
Whether the financial costs, efficiency losses, and the tradeoffs between 
food and fuel associated with these various support measures are justified 
depends on the environmental and social benefits and risks of biofuels 
and their contribution to energy security. Yet, the challenge for developing 
country governments is to avoid supporting biofuels through distortionary 
incentives that might displace alternative activities with higher returns and 
to implement regulations and devise certification systems to reduced 
environmental risks. In other words, governments need to carefully assess 
economic, environmental, and social benefits as well as the potential to 
enhance energy security. 
Indeed, agriculture is one of the riskiest sectors of economic 
activity and effective risk-reducing instruments are severely lacking in 
rural areas. Negative shocks can deplete assets through distress sales of 
land and livestock; and it can take a very longtime for households to 
recover from such losses. When income and assets shocks coincide, 
households have to choose between reducing consumption and depleting 
assets. However, rural households often identify weather-related and 
health shocks as their biggest risks; and the immediate production and 
welfare losses associated with drought can be substantial. Illnesses and 
injuries in a family simultaneously reduce income because of lost time 
working and deplete household savings because of spending on 
treatment. Farmers also worry about abrupt changes in rules for land 
tenure or regulations for trade and rural political violence (crime) can also 
cause considerable form productivity losses. Here, the lack of access to 
insurance and credit markets make agricultural producers particularly 
vulnerable. Thus, households often reduce their consumption risk by 
choosing low-risk activities or technology, which typically have low 
average returns. Again, shocks can be idiosyncratic (when one households 
experience is weakly related to that of neighboring households) or 
covariate (when households in a same geographical area or social network 
suffer similar shock). Idiosyncratic shocks can arise from microclimatic 
variation, local wildlife damage or pest infestation, illness and property 
losses from fire or theft. On the other hand, covariate shocks, arising from 
war, natural disasters, price instability or financial crises, are often difficult 
to insure locally and require some coordinate external response. 
In agriculture-based and transforming countries, small and 
medium-size traders and layers of intermediaries are common in the 
marketing of food staples and other agricultural commodities. Often one 
 45 
person business dealing in several commodities, the traders and 
intermediaries are mainly self- funded because of limited access to credit. 
They maximize the returns on their working capital by rapidly turning over 
small quantities (with little storage). Quality grades are rarely 
standardized (nor are weights and measures) making personal inspection 
by buyers essential. This requires that traders travel extensively increasing 
transaction costs. Therefore, market modernization, beyond improving 
basic transport, includes marketing information systems, commodity 
exchanges and price-risk management. However, inadequate transport 
infrastructure and services in rural areas push up marketing costs, 
undermining local markets and exports. Thus, improving road connections 
is critical to strengthening the links of farmers and the rural economy to 
local, regional, and international markets. Market information keeps 
farmers and traders attuned to the demands and changing preferences of 
consumers, guiding farming, marketing and investing. But public market 
information systems have often been disappointing, with information 
disseminated too slowly, in the wrong form, or too in frequently to be of 
real use of market participants. Yet, several innovative approaches are 
being piloted in different parts of the world, building on advances in 
communications technology (ICTS) and the liberalization of 
telecommunications and broadcasting. Again, the perishability of most 
high-value agricultural products requires careful handling, special facilities 
(Pack houses, cold storage, and refrigerated transport) and rapid delivery 
to consumer to maintain quality and reduce physical and nutritional 
losses. In many counties, the long supply chain; poor access to roads and 
electricity; and inadequate infrastructure and services in physical markets 
add to the transaction costs and cause quality deterioration and spoilage 
losses. Again market infrastructure and facilities are often limited and 
congested, increasing the difficulty of trading perishable goods. 
Agribusiness is the off-farm link in agro food value chains. It 
provides inputs to the farm sector and it links the farm sector to 
consumers through the handling, processing, transportation, marketing, 
and distribution of food as well as other agricultural products. Thus, there 
exist strong synergies between agribusiness and the performance of 
agriculture for development. Here, dynamic and efficient agribusiness 
spurs agricultural growth; and a strong link between agribusiness and 
smallholders can reduce rural poverty. Essentially, agribusiness comprises 
diverse private agro enterprises (small and mostly in rural market towns 
as operated by households that often have wage labor and farming as 
other sources of income); medium and large agro enterprises (mainly 
urban based due to the requirements for economies of scale and 
infrastructure); and large enterprises (dominated by multinational 
corporations that have consolidated through vertical and horizontal 
integration). However, in recent years, influenced by changes in consumer 
 46 
demand and rapid technological and institutional innovations, the 
structure of agribusiness has changed dramatically and its performance 
has been highly dynamic. Consequently, market forces do not guarantee 
competitiveness, nor do they guarantee smallholder participation (both 
essential to link agricultural growth to development). And driven by gains 
from economies of scale and globalization of the food chain, multinational 
agro enterprises increasingly dominate the agribusiness sector along the 
value chain. They provide inputs such as pesticides, seeds and crop 
genetic technologies that have consolidated horizontally and vertically into 
a small number of multinational firms. On the marketing side, a few 
multinational enterprises are broadly diversified from seeds, feeds and 
fertilizers to product handling and processing of sweeteners and biofuels. 
Food processing firms are integrating backward to primary product 
handling and forward to retail distribution. Again, retailing has been 
transformed by the “supermarket revolution”. In other words, national, 
regional and global supply chains are being radically altered, by passing 
traditional markets where small holders sell to local markets and traders. 
Institutions governing land rights and ownership affect the 
efficiency of land use. That is, if those who farm lack secure rights to land, 
they have less incentive to exert effort to use it productively and 
sustainable or to carry out land-related investments. Secure and 
unambiguous property rights also allow markets to transfer land to more 
productive uses and users. Cost-effective systems of land administration 
facilitate agricultural investment and lower the cost of credit by increasing 
the use of land as collateral (thus reducing risk for financial institutions). 
Sales markets for acquiring land increase investment incentives and 
provide a basis for using land as collateral in credit markets. However, 
imperfections in other markets and expectations of future land price 
increases, affect markets for land sales more than those for rentals, 
implying that sales would not necessarily transfer land to the most 
productive producers. Historically, most land sales happened under 
distress, requiring defaulting landowners to cede their land to money 
lenders (who could amass huge amount of it). Therefore, the ability of 
agricultural enterprises and rural households to invest for the long-term 
and make calculated decisions for risky and time-patterned income flows 
is shaped by an economy’s financial services. Despite the rapid 
development of financial services, a majority of small holders Worldwide 
remain without access to the services they need to compete and improve 
their livelihoods. Here, broader access to financial services (savings and 
credit products, financial transactions and transfer services for 
remittances) would expand their opportunities for more efficient 
technology adoption and resource allocation. Yet, financial constraints are 
more pervasive in agriculture and related activities than in many other 
sectors, reflecting both the nature of agricultural activity and the average 
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size of firms. In fact, financial contracts in rural areas involve higher 
transaction costs and risks than those in urban settings because of the 
greater spatial dispersion of production; lower population densities; 
generally lower quality of infrastructure; and the seasonality and often 
high covariance of rural production activities. Consequently, banks and 
other traditional for-nonprofit financial intermediaries lend to limit their 
activities to urban areas and to more densely populated, more affluent, 
more commercial areas of the rural economy. Thus, the inadequacies of 
rural financial markets reflect real risks and real transaction costs that 
cannot simply be wished or legislated away. Innovations are therefore 
required to permit more flexible forms of lending while guaranteeing that 
borrowers repay loans. One approach to resolve these problems follows 
from the creation of microfinance institutions (MFIs), which open the 
menu of available contracts with new arrangements that substitute for 
collateral. However, MFIS cannot provide the mainstay of rural finance. 
Therefore, promoting, improving or even creating rural institutions to 
support a wide-range of rural financial transactions, remains one of the 
fundamental challenges facing developing-country governments. Yet, 
government sponsored agricultural lending institutions have been 
successful in many non-developed economies. But in many developing 
countries, government efforts to improve rural financial markets have a 
record of doing more harm than good; heavily distorting market prices; 
repressing and crowding out private financial activities; and creating 
centralized, inefficient and frequently overstaffed bureaucracies captured 
by politics. Again, risk distorts investments and puts assets in jeopardy. 
Thus, individuals and local networks can do much to manage risk, but 
such strategies often founder on systematic risk, beyond the capacity of 
the individual and community to manage. Innovations to address 
systematic risk can complement the local capacity to manage idiosyncratic 
risks. Consequently, the expectation is that the innovations will underwrite 
a more productive and sustainable pattern of agricultural and human 
capital investment. Thus one element of any strategy to address the cost 
of risk is to expand a household’s risk management opportunities. 
Communities have therefore developed informal systems of mutual 
insurance and contingent loans to respond to shocks based on traditional 
norms and local information. But these systems tend to fail poor families, 
one reason is the inherent limitation of insuring for covariate shocks: one’s 
neighbors cannot provide assistance if they are under stress. Mutual 
insurance, though useful, tends to be weakest for the poorest and to fall 
short when it is most needed. 
Indeed, the technological challenges facing agriculture in the 21
st
 
century are probably even more daunting than those in recent decades 
with the increasing scarcity of land and water, productivity gains will be 
the main source of growth in agriculture and the primary means to satisfy 
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increased demand for food and agricultural products. With globalization 
and new supply chains, farmers and countries need to continually 
innovate to respond to changing market demands and stay competitive. 
Revolutionary advances in the biological and information sciences have 
the potential to enhance the competitiveness of market-oriented 
smallholders and overcome drought and disease in production systems 
important to the poor. Here, the institutional setting for technological 
innovation is changing rapidly and it is more complex, involving plural 
systems (multiple sources of innovations). Therefore, the new world of 
agriculture is opening space for a wider range of actors in innovation 
(including farmers, private sector, and civil society organization). Thus, 
linking technological progress with institutional innovations and markets to 
engage this diverse set of actors is at the heart of future of productivity 
growth. 
 
 
8.0 AFRICAN CASE 
Over the past three decades, the growth performance of African countries 
has been rather disappointing. In fact, the average annual growth rate of 
per capita real income declined significantly in this period, compared with 
the record achieved in the postwar period up to the 1970s, and this 
deterioration worsened progressively in the first half of the 1980s (Otani 
and Villanueva, 1990). This poor growth performance was accompanied 
by a marked decline in the investment ratio in most countries. And despite 
this decline, expenditures on investment exceeded domestic savings 
substantially, causing rapid increases in foreign borrowing and external 
debt. Consequently, external payment positions become unsustainable in 
many African counties. Therefore, many countries attempted to compress 
aggregate demand, further weakening investment in both physical and 
human capital. The adverse implications of the compressed investments 
activity triggered alarming signals, echoed in economic and business 
circles, governments and international organizations. 
Specifically, aggregate economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa 
during the past decade has remained unsatisfactory. Both domestic and 
external factors have contributed to the disappointing overall performance 
(Ghara and Hadjimichael, 1996). The external environment, characterized 
by sharp declines in world commodity prices and substantial losses in the 
terms of trade has been generally unfavorable. These effects has also 
been compounded by unfavorable weather and all countries in the region 
have been confronted with deep rooted development constraints (rapid 
population growth, low human capital development and inadequate 
infrastructure) which have constituted major impediments to private 
sector development and the supply response of the economies. Again, 
ethnic conflicts, political instability, adverse security conditions, protracted 
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civil wars, governance concerns, legacy of repressive regimes, bloated 
(inefficient , public administration, ineffective judicial systems, complex 
administrative (institutional) frameworks as well as inappropriate 
economic  policies have also contributed to the weak aggregate economic 
performance. In recent years however, some of the common shocks 
which are believed to have constrained economic management took 
several forms. The instability in export earnings arises from the 
concentration of Africa’s exports on a few primary commodities, their low 
income and price elasticities, sharp swings in their demand and supply, 
and the geographical concentration of the exports. Again changes in 
major import prices especially prices of critical imports (like oil) can have 
destabilizing effects as well as changes in cost of foreign borrowing. Thus, 
given Africa’s stock of existing debt and need for new external borrowing, 
an increase in interest rate in international capital market can seriously 
affect government budget. Indeed, there is a sense in which many of 
these shocks originate from the deliberate policies of industrial countries. 
Here, the ties between Africa and the industrial countries have tended to 
be procyclical, with the result that the impact of any shock is rather 
amplified than dampened. In fact, past events have shown that recession 
in industrial countries weaken demand for the primary commodity exports 
of Africa, reduces net resource transfers to the region and exacerbate the 
downturns in Africa’s economic activity (UNECA, 1993). 
 In particular, the massive and unprecedented intervention by many 
governments around the world appears to have halted the 2008 financial 
meltdown. But while global banks were crashing all round it, the industry 
in Africa remained firm. Perhaps, the most interesting African trend at 
present is the boom in frontier discoveries that is helping to spread the 
benefits of hydrocarbons to more countries. Yet, it is difficult to ignore the 
global economic crisis. Africa may have fewer ties to the global economic 
system than most other regions and so is sheltered from the credit crisis 
to some extent, but recession in North America, Europe and East Asia 
parts will cut demand for the raw materials that underpin most African 
economies. At the same time, European and North American demand for 
Chinese consumer goods is likely to fall, triggering lower demand for oil, 
copper, iron one and other raw materials in Africa’s fastest growing 
trading partner. This should not have such a big impact on the African oil 
industry, as long as oil prices remain fairly buoyant. However, the credit 
crisis could affect upstream development of oil companies are unable to 
secure sufficient financial support. This is particularly crucial for the 
independents that have discovered oil and gas in relatively unattractive 
regions for the first time and which need to attract the support of larger 
partners of financial institutions to fund field development. Thus, the full 
impact of the economic crisis remains to be seen and reduced market 
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liquidity will surely affect some projects, but the most attractive projects 
may still proceed. 
 Consequently, the effects of fiscal policies on the growth rate of 
potential GNP are transmitted through changes in the ratios to GNP of tax 
revenue, non-capital expenditure and the budget deficit. The composition 
of government expenditures and taxes also affect the growth rate of 
potential GNP. Table 8.1 shows the comparative African tax performance 
(World bank, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8.1 COMPARATIVE AFRICAN TAX 
PERFORMANCES 
A 
S/N 
B 
COUNTRY 
C 
REGIONAL 
INCOME PROFILE 
D 
TAX REVENUE 
PERCENTAGE 
OF GDP 
 
2001 
E 
 TAX ON 
INCOME, 
PROFITS, 
CAPITAL 
GAINS % OF 
TOTAL TAXES 
2001 
F 
DOMESITC 
TAXES ON 
GOODS/SERVICES  
% OF VALUE 
ADDED ON 
INDUSTRY AND 
SERVICES 2001 
1 ALGERIA NALMI 32.10 77.90 3.30 
2 ANGOLA SALMI - - - 
3 BENIN WALI - - - 
4 BOTSWANA SAUMI - - - 
5 BURKINA FASO WALI - - - 
6 BURUNDI EALI 16.70 22.50 17.00 
7 CAMEROON CALMI 12.50 26..00 7.20 
8 CAPE VERDE WALMI - - - 
9 CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUB. 
CALI - - - 
10 CHAD CALI - - - 
11 COMOROS EALI - - - 
12 CONGO (DEM REP) CALI 0.00 16.70 0.00 
13 CONG (REP.) CALI 10.70 16.00 6.60 
14 COTE D’ VOIRE WALI 16.90 21.00 4.90 
15 DJIBOUTI NALMI - - - 
16 EGYPT NALMI - - - 
17 EQUAT. GINEA CAUMI - - - 
18 ERITREA EALI - - - 
19 ETHIOPIA EALI 13.00 33.10 7.40 
20 GABON CAUMI - - - 
21 GAMBIA WALI - - - 
22 GHANA WALI - - - 
23 GUINEA WALI 11.20 10.10 0.80 
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24 GUINEA BISSAU WALI - - - 
25 KENYA EALI - - - 
26 LESOTHO EALMI - - - 
27 LIBERIA WALI - - - 
28 LIBYA NAUMI - - - 
29 MADAGASCAR EALI 11.30 15.70 5.20 
30 MALAWI EALI - - - 
31 MALI WALI - - - 
32 MAURITANIA WALI - - - 
33 MAURITIUS SAUMI 17.40 14.00 9.20 
34 MAYOTTE SAUMI - - - 
35 MOROCCO NALMI 25.00 28.50 12.70 
36 MOZAMBIQUE EALI - - - 
37 NAMIBIA SALMI 29.90 35.30 8.80 
38 NIGER WALI - - - 
39 NIGERIA WALI - - - 
40 RWANDA EALI - - - 
41 SAOT. & PRINC. CALI - - - 
42 SENEGAL WALI 17.00 22.80 7.20 
43 SEYCHLLES SAUMI - - - 
44 SIERRA LEONE WALI 6.80 26.90 2.80 
45 SOMALIA EALI - - - 
46 SOUTH  AFRICA SAUMI 26.50 57.00 10.80 
47 SUDAN EALI 6.60 18.30 5.10 
48 SWAZILAND SALI 26.60 26.40 6.60 
49 TANZANIA EALI - - - 
50 TOGO WALI - - - 
51 TUNISIA NALMI 26.00 22.30 12.50 
52 UGANDA EALI 10.70 20.10 5.30 
53 ZAIRE SALI - - - 
54 ZAMBIA SALI - - - 
55 ZIMBABWE SALI - - - 
Table 8.1 cont. 
 
S/N 
COUNTRY G 
EXPORT DUTIES 
PERCENTAGE OF 
TAX REVENUE 
 
2001 
H 
IMPORT DUTIES 
PERCENTAGE OF 
TAX REVENUE 
2001 
I 
INDIVIDUAL 
HIGHEST 
MARGINAL RAX 
RATE (%) 
 
2002 
J 
CORPORATE 
HIHEST 
MARGICAL RAX 
RATE (%) 
 
2002 
1 ALGERIA 0.00 12.10 - - 
2 ANGOLA - - - - 
3 BENIN -- - - - 
4 BOTSWANA -- - 25.00 15.00 
5 BURKINA FASO -- - - - 
6 BURUNDI 0.00 16.40 - - 
7 CAMEROON 3.90 31.60 60.00 39.00 
8 CAPE VERDE - - - - 
9 CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUB. 
- - - - 
10 CHAD - - - - 
11 COMOROS - - - - 
12 CONGO (DEM REP) 1.00 33.70 60.00 40.00 
13 CONG (REP.) 0.00 23.20 50.00 45.00 
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14 COTE D’ VOIRE 15.30 27.60 10.00 35.00 
15 DJIBOUTI - - - - 
16 EGYPT - - 32.00 40.00 
17 EQUAT. GINEA - - - - 
18 ERITREA - - - - 
19 ETHIOPIA 2.90 26.30 - - 
20 GABON - - 50.00 35.00 
21 GAMBIA - - - - 
22 GHANA - - 30.00 33.00 
23 GUINEA 0.20 42.90 - - 
24 GUINEA BISSAU - - - - 
25 KENYA - - 30.00 30.00 
26 LESOTHO - - - - 
27 LIBERIA - - - - 
28 LIBYA - - - - 
29 MADAGASCAR 0.00 53.50 - - 
30 MALAWI - - 38.00 38.00 
31 MALI - - - - 
32 MAURITANIA - - - - 
33 MAURITIUS 0.00 29.30 25.00 25.00 
34 MAYOTTE - - - - 
35 MOROCCO 0.00 18.80 44.00 35.00 
36 MOZAMBIQUE - - 20.00 35.00 
37 NAMIBIA - - 36.00 35.00 
38 NIGER - - - - 
39 NIGERIA - - 25.00 30.00 
40 RWANDA - - - - 
41 SAOT. & PRINC. - - - - 
42 SENEGAL - - 50.00 35.00 
43 SEYCHLLES - - - - 
44 SIERRA LEONE 0.00 49.80 - - 
45 SOMALIA - - - - 
46 SOUTH  AFRICA 0.00 2.90 42.00 30.00 
47 SUDAN 0.80 35.50 - - 
48 SWAZILAND 0.00 54.70 39.00 30.00 
49 TANZANIA - - 30.00 30.00 
50 TOGO - - - - 
51 TUNISIA 0.10 12.50 - - 
52 UGANDA 0.00 50.30 30.00 30.00 
53 ZAIRE - - - - 
54 ZAMBIA - - 30.00 
35.00 
55 ZIMBABWE 
- - 46.00 30.00 
 
NOTES: NA = North Africa, EA= East Africa; WA= West Africa; CA= 
Central Africa, SA= South Africa, LI= Low income, CMI = Low Middle 
Income, UMI = Upper Middle Income 
 
SOURCES: World Bank, World Development Indicators, United Nations 
Human Development Reports. 
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Essentially, taxes are the main source of revenue for many governments 
and the sources of the tax revenue received by governments as well as 
the relative contributions  of these sources are determined by policy 
choices about where and how  to impose taxes and by changes in the 
structure of the economy. Here, tax policy may reflect concerns about 
distributional effects, economic efficiency (including corrections for 
externalities) and the practical problems of administering a tax system. 
There is no ideal level of taxation but taxes influence incentives and thus 
the behavior of economic actors and the economy’s competitiveness. 
Taxes are compulsory transfers to governments from individuals, business 
or institutions, and they include service fees that are dearly out of 
proportion to the costs of providing the services but exclude fines, 
penalties, and compulsory social security contributions. Here, taxes are 
considered unrequited because governments provide nothing specifically 
in return for them, although taxes typically are used to provide goods or 
services to individuals or communities on a collective basis. Usually, the 
level of taxation is typically measured by tax revenue as a share of gross 
domestic product (GDP). Therefore, comparing the levels of taxation 
across countries provides a quick overview of the fiscal obligations and 
incentives facing the private sector. In the presented table, tax data in 
local currencies are normalized by scaling values in the same units to ease 
cross country comparisons. Again, the table shows only central 
government data, which may significantly understate the total tax burden, 
particularly in countries where provincial and municipal governments are 
large or have considerable tax authority. Here, low ratios of tax revenue 
to GDP may reflect weak administration and large-scale tax avoidance or 
evasion. They may also reflect the presence of a sizable parallel economy 
with unrecorded and undisclosed incomes. Tax revenue ratios tend to rise 
with income, with higher-income countries relying on taxes to finance a 
much broader range of social services and social security than lower-
income countries are able to provide. As economies develop, their 
capacity to tax residents directly typically expands and indirect taxes 
become less important as a source of revenue. Thus, the share of taxes 
on income, profits and capital gains is one measure of an economy’s (and 
tax systems) level of development. Actually, in the early stages of 
development, governments tend to rely on indirect taxes because the 
administrative costs of collecting them are relatively low. Yet, the two 
main indirect are international trade taxes (plus customs revenue) and 
domestic taxes on goods and services. Table 8.1 shows these domestic 
taxes as a percentage of value added in industry and services. Here, 
agriculture and mining are excluded from the dominator because indirect 
taxes on goods originating from these sectors are usually negligible. 
However, what is missing is a measure of the uniformity of these taxes 
across industries and along the value added chain of production. Without 
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such data, no clear inferences can be drawn about how neutral a tax 
system is between subsection “Surplus” revenues raised by some 
governments by charging higher prices for goods produced under 
monopoly by state-owned enterprises are not counted as tax revenues. 
Equally, losses from charging below-market prices for products are rarely 
identified as subsidies. 
Export and import duties are shown separately because the burden they 
impose on the economy is likely to be large. Typically, export duties levied 
on primary products often take the place of direct taxes on income and 
profits but reduced the incentive to export and encourage a shift to other 
products. On the other hand, high import duties penalize consumers; 
create protective barriers (which promote higher priced output and 
inefficient production) and implicitly tax exports. However, lower trade 
taxes enhance openness (to foreign competition, knowledge, technologies 
and resources) energizing development in many ways. Actually, the tax 
revenues collected by governments are the outcomes of systems that are 
often complex, containing many exceptions, exemptions, penalties and 
other inducements   that affect the incidence of taxes and thus influence 
the decisions of workers, managers and entrepreneurs. Here, a potentially 
important influence on both domestic and international investors is a tax 
system’s progressivism, as reflected in the highest marginal tax rate on 
individual and corporate income. Figures for individual marginal tax rates 
generally refer to employment income; and in some countries the highest 
marginal tax rate is also the basic or flat rate and other surtaxes, 
deductions and the like may apply. Again, in many countries, several 
different corporate tax rates may be levied, depending on the type of 
business (mining, banking, insurance, agriculture, and manufacturing), 
ownership (domestic or foreign), volume of sales or whether surtaxes or 
exemptions are included. 
In the above table, the corporate tax rates are mainly generally rates 
applied to domestic companies. Tax revenue comprises compulsory 
transfers to the central government for public purposes and compulsory 
transfers such as fines, penalties, most social security contributions are 
excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue 
are treated as negative revenue. Taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains are levied on wages, salaries, tips, fees, commission, and other 
labor services compensation; interest, dividends, rent, and royalties; 
profits of business, estates, and trusts; and capital gains an losses. Social 
security contributions based on gross pay, payroll, or number of 
employees are not included, but taxable portions of social security, 
pensions and other retirement account distributions are included. 
Domestic taxes on goods and services include all taxes and duties levied 
by central governments on the production, extraction, sale, transfer, 
leasing or delivery of goods and rendering of services, or on the use of 
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goods or permission to use goods or perform activities. These include 
value added taxes, general sales taxes, single-stage and multistage taxes 
(stage implying stage of production or distributions) excise taxes, motor 
vehicle taxes, and taxes on the extraction, processing or production of 
minerals or other products. Export duties include all levies collected on 
goods at the point of export and rebates on exported goods that are 
repayments of previously paid general consumption taxes, excise taxes, or 
import duties are deducted from the gross amounts receivable from these 
taxes, not from amounts receivable from these taxes, not from amounts 
receivable from export duties. Import duties comprise all levies collected 
on goods at the point of entry into the country and the levies may be 
imposed for revenue or protection purposes and may be determined on a 
specific or advalorem basis as long as they are restricted to imported 
products. Again, the highest marginal tax rate is the highest rate shown 
on the schedule of tax rates applied to the annual taxable income of 
individuals and corporations. The income levels above which the highest 
marginal tax rates for individuals apply are also presented. 
Indeed, a surge in debt forgiveness grants (as from 2002) has drawn 
attention to their treatment in official development assistance (ODA) 
statistics. These grants from the OECD’s development assistance 
committee (DAC) countries have increased tremendously. In particular, 
one-half to three quarters of these grants have been allocated to sub-
Saharan African and the prominence of debt relief in aid flows in recent 
years is evident. Essentially, debt relief from the donors’ perspective 
(budget office) can be quite different from that from the recipients’ 
perspective (availability of resources). However, one important question 
that arises then is whether ODA debt forgiveness grants represent 
additional flows (Cross-border flows) to recipients. Here, several advocacy 
groups have argued that ODA statistics are misleading because debt 
cancellations do not represent “genuine” aid. Yet, DAC statistical 
guidelines allow debt cancellation to be reported as debt forgiveness when 
the action on debt occurs within the framework of a bilateral agreement 
and is implemented for the purpose of promoting the development or 
welfare of the recipient. Although debt cancellation may not deliver 
additional flows to borrowers, it does reflect government budget effort. 
The extent of the budget effort will depend on the terms of government 
guarantees for export and commercial credits and on the timing of write-
offs for official loans. And because of the differences in practices across 
donors, the extent of the budget effort for a particular debt action varies 
across countries. Table 8.2 shows the African Debt Profile. 
 
TABEL 8.2 COMPARATIVE AFRICAN DEBT (AID) PROFILE 
A 
S/N 
B 
COUNTRY 
C 
REGIONAL 
D 
NET AID FROM 
E 
NET AID FROM 
F 
NET AID FROM 
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INCOME PROFILE ALL DONORS 
(2004 $ 
MILLIONS) 2005 
DAC DONORS 
(2004 $ 
MILLIONS) 
2005 
MULITILATERAL 
DONORS 2005 
1 ALGERIA NALMI 371 290 71 
2 ANGOLA SALMI 442 258 183 
3 BENIN WALI 349 207 142 
4 BOTSWANA SAUMI 71 52 19 
5 BURKINA FASO WALI 660 339 319 
6 BURUNDI EALI 365 181 184 
7 CAMEROON CALMI 414 336 77 
8 CAPE VERDE WALMI 161 104 56 
9 CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUB. 
CALI 95 62 33 
10 CHAD CALI 380 167 213 
11 COMOROS EALI 25 17 08 
12 CONGO (DEM REP) CALI 1,828 1034 793 
13 CONG (REP.) CALI 1,449 1,360 89 
14 COTE D’ VOIRE WALI 119 151 -32 
15 DJIBOUTI NALMI 79 54 23 
16 EGYPT NALMI 926 659 238 
17 EQUAT. GINEA CAUMI 39 30 09 
18 ERITREA EALI 355 226 132 
19 ETHIOPIA EALI 1937 1202 706 
20 GABON CAUMI 54 30 24 
21 GAMBIA WALI 58 15 43 
22 GHANA WALI 1120 603 503 
23 GUINEA WALI 182 128 54 
24 GUINEA BISSAU WALI 79 39 40 
25 KENYA EALI 768 495 260 
26 LESOTHO EALMI 69 39 30 
27 LIBERIA WALI 236 149 87 
28 LIBYA NAUMI 24 17 04 
29 MADAGASCAR EALI 929 500 429 
30 MALAWI EALI 575 322 251 
31 MALI WALI 691 378 313 
32 MAURITANIA WALI 190 125 66 
33 MAURITIUS SAUMI 32 22 10 
34 MAYOTTE SAUMI - - - 
35 MOROCCO NALMI 652 289 309 
36 MOZAMBIQUE EALI 1286 771 513 
37 NAMIBIA SALMI 123 99 23 
38 NIGER WALI 515 256 259 
39 NIGERIA WALI 6437 5966 471 
40 RWANDA EALI 576 292 284 
41 SAOT. & PRINC. CALI 32 18 13 
42 SENEGAL WALI 689 440 249 
43 SEYCHLLES SAUMI 19 08 11 
44 SIERRA LEONE WALI 343 130 213 
45 SOMALIA EALI 236 146 90 
46 SOUTH  AFRICA SAUMI 700 486 213 
47 SUDAN EALI 1829 1472 315 
48 SWAZILAND SALI 46 20 26 
49 TANZANIA EALI 1505 871 622 
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50 TOGO WALI 87 59 27 
51 TUNISIA NALMI 376 269 105 
52 UGANDA EALI 1198 704 492 
53 ZAIRE SALI - - - 
54 ZAMBIA SALI 945 836 109 
55 ZIMBABWE SALI 368 179 189 
Table 8.2 cont. 
 
S/N 
COUNTRY G 
NET AID SHARE GDP 
(PERCENTAGE) 
2005 
H 
HIPC DEBT 
INITIATIVE 
DECISION OINT 
2006 
I 
HIPC DEBT 
INITIATIVE 
COMPLETION 
POINT  
 
2006 
J 
DEBT SERVICE 
RELIEF 
COMMITTED ($ 
MILLION) 
 
2006 
1 ALGERIA 0.40 - - - 
2 ANGOLA 01.30 - - - 
3 BENIN 08.10 JUL.2000 MAR. 3000 460 
4 BOTSWANA 00.70 - - - 
5 BURKINA FASO 11.60 JUL.2000 APR. 2002 930 
6 BURUNDI 45.60 OCT.2000 FLOATING 1,472 
7 CAMEROON 02.50 OCT.2000 APR. 2006 4,917 
8 CAPE VERDE 16.10 - - - 
9 CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUB. 
07.00 - - - 
10 CHAD 06.40 MAY 2001 FLOATING 260 
11 COMOROS 06.50 - - - 
12 CONGO (DEM REP) 25.70 JUL. 2003 FLOATING 10.389 
13 CONG (REP.) 24.30 - - 2,881 
14 COTE D’ VOIRE 00.70 MAR. 1998 - - 
15 DJIBOUTI 11.10 - - - 
16 EGYPT 01.00 - - - 
17 EQUAT. GINEA 00.50 - - - 
18 ERITREA 036.60 - - - 
19 ETHIOPIA 17.00 NOV 2001 APR 2004 3,275 
20 GABON 00.60 - - - 
21 GAMBIA 12.60 DEC. 2000 FLOATING 90 
22 GHANA 10.40 FEB. 2002 JUL. 2004 3,500 
23 GUINEA 05.50 DEC. 2000 FLOATING 800 
24 GUINEA BISSAU 26.30 DEC. 2000 FLOATING 790 
25 KENYA 04.00 - - - 
26 LESOTHO 04.7 - - - 
27 LIBERIA 44.60 - - - 
28 LIBYA 00.10 - - - 
29 MADAGASCAR 18.40 DEC. 2000 OCT 2004 1,900 
30 MALAWI 27.70 DEC. 2000 FLOATING 1,000 
31 MALI 13.00 AUG. 2000 MAR 2003 895 
32 MAURITANIA 10.40 FEB. 2000 JUN 2002 1,100 
33 MAURITIUS 00.50 - - - 
34 MAYOTTE - - - - 
35 MOROCCO 01.30 - - - 
36 MOZAMBIQUE 18.80 APR. 2000 SPE. 2001 4, 300 
37 NAMIBIA 02.00 - - - 
38 NIGER 15.20 DEC 2000 JUN 2004 1190 
39 NIGERIA 06.60 - - - 
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40 RWANDA 26.70 DEC 2000 JUN 2005 1316 
41 SAOT. & PRINC. 28.30 DEC 2000 FLOATING 200 
42 SENEGAL 08.00 JUN 2000 APR 2004 850 
43 SEYCHLLES 2.60 - - - 
44 SIERRA LEONE 28.80 MAR 2002 FLOATING 950 
45 SOMALIA - - - - 
46 SOUTH  AFRICA 00.30 - - - 
47 SUDAN 06.60 - - - 
48 SWAZILAND 01.80 - - - 
49 TANZANIA 12.00 APR 2000 NOV 2001 3,000 
50 TOGO 04.10 - - - 
51 TUNISIA 01.30 - - - 
52 UGANDA 13.70 FEB 2000 MAY 2000 1950 
53 ZAIRE - - - - 
54 ZAMBIA 13 DEC 2000 APR 2005 
3,900 
55 ZIMBABWE 10.80 
- - - 
NOTES: NA= North Africa; EA= East Africa; WA= West Africa, 
CA=Central Africa; SA= South Africa; LI= Low Income; LMI= Low Middle 
Income, UMI= Upper Middle Income 
 
SOURCES: World Bank African Development Indicators (2007) united 
Nations (H.D) Report. 
 
Here, Net aid from all donors is met aid from the organization for 
Economic co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC); Non-DAC bilateral (OPEC); former council for mutual 
economic assistance (CMEA) countries; CHINA (OECD data) and 
multilateral donors. The Net aid from DAC donors is net aid from OECD’s 
DAC donors. The Net aid from multilateral donors is net aid from 
multilateral sources, such as the African Development Fund; European 
Development fund for the commission of the European Communities; the 
international Development Association; the International fund for 
Agricultural Development Arab and OPEC financed multilateral agencies, 
and United Nations Programs and agencies. Aid flows from the 
International Monetary Funds (IMF) trust fund and structural Adjustment 
facility are also included. United Nations programs and agencies include 
the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, United Nations 
Development Programme, United Nations Office of the High commissioner 
for refugees, United Nations Children’s Fund and the World food 
programme. Arab and OPEC Financed Multilateral agencies include the 
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab fund for Economic 
and Social development; Islamic development bank; OPEC fund for 
international Development; Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and 
Development, Arab fund for technical assistance to African (Arab) 
countries and the Islamic solidarity fund. Here, the Net aid as a share of 
gross domestic product (GDP) is calculated by dividing the nominal total 
net aid from all donors by nominal GDP. For a given level of aid flows, 
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devaluation of a recipient’s currency may inflate the across countries that 
have implement different exchange rate policies should be interpreted 
carefully. Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) Debt initiative point is 
the date at which an HIPC with an established track record of good 
performance under adjustment programs supported by the international 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank Commits to undertake additional 
reforms and to develop and implement a poverty reduction strategy. 
Then, the country receives the bulk of debt relief under the HIPC initiative 
without further policy conditions. The debt service relief committed is the 
amount of debt service relief, calculated at the decision point that will 
allow the country to achieve debt sustainability at the completion point. 
The African agricultural productivity statistics is shown in table 8.3 (World 
bank, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8.3 AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
STATISTICS 
A 
S/N 
B 
COUNTRY 
C 
REGIONAL 
INCOME  PROFILE 
D 
PREVALENCE 
OF CHILD 
MALNUTRITION 
% OF CHILDREN 
UNDER FIVE  
1990-1995 
E 
PREVALENCE 
OF CHILD 
MALNUTRITION 
% OF CHILDREN 
UNDER FIVE  
2000-2006 
F 
GROSS DOMETIC 
PRODUCT & 
MILLIONS 
 
 
2006 
1 ALGERIA NALMI 13 10 114,727 
2 ANGOLA SALMI - 31 44,033 
3 BENIN WALI - 30 4,775 
4 BOTSWANA SAUMI - - - 
5 BURKINA FASO WALI 33 38 6,205 
6 BURUNDI EALI - 45 807 
7 CAMEROON CALMI 15 18 18,323 
8 CAPE VERDE WALMI - - - 
9 CENTRAL 
AFRICAN REPUB. 
CALI 23 24 1,486 
10 CHAD CALI - 37 6,541 
11 COMOROS EALI - - - 
12 CONGO (DEM REP) CALI 34 31 8,543 
13 CONG (REP.) CALI - - 1,385 
14 COTE D’ VOIRE WALI 24 17 17,484 
15 DJIBOUTI NALMI - - - 
16 EGYPT NALMI 17 09 107,484 
17 EQUAT. GINEA CAUMI - - - 
18 ERITREA EALI 44 40 1085 
19 ETHIOPIA EALI 48 38 13,315 
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20 GABON CAUMI - - - 
21 GAMBIA WALI - - - 
22 GHANA WALI 27 22 12906 
23 GUINEA WALI 27 33 3317 
24 GUINEA BISSAU WALI - - - 
25 KENYA EALI 23 20 21,186 
26 LESOTHO EALMI - - - 
27 LIBERIA WALI - - - 
28 LIBYA NAUMI - - - 
29 MADAGASCAR EALI 34 42 5,499 
30 MALAWI EALI 30 22 2232 
31 MALI WALI - 33 5929 
32 MAURITANIA WALI 48 32 2663 
33 MAURITIUS SAUMI - - - 
34 MAYOTTE SAUMI - - - 
35 MOROCCO NALMI 10 10 57,307 
36 MOZAMBIQUE EALI 27 24 7608 
37 NAMIBIA SALMI 26 24 6372 
38 NIGER WALI 43 40 3544 
39 NIGERIA WALI 39 29 114,686 
40 RWANDA EALI 29 23 2,494 
41 SAOT. & PRINC. CALI - - - 
42 SENEGAL WALI 22 23 8,936 
43 SEYCHLLES SAUMI - - - 
44 SIERRA LEONE WALI 29 27 1443 
45 SOMALIA EALI - - - 
46 SOUTH  AFRICA SAUMI 09 - 254,992 
47 SUDAN EALI 34 41 37,565 
48 SWAZILAND SALI - - - 
49 TANZANIA EALI 29 22 12,784 
50 TOGO WALI - - 2206 
51 TUNISIA NALMI 09 04 30298 
52 UGANDA EALI 26 23 9,322 
53 ZAIRE SALI - - - 
54 ZAMBIA SALI 25 23 10,907 
55 ZIMBABWE SALI 16 - 5,010 
Table 8.3 cont. 
 
S/N 
COUNTRY G 
GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT AVERAGE 
ANNUAL % 
GROWTH  
 
2000-2006 
H 
AGRICULTURAL 
VALUE ADDED 
PER WORKER ($ 
2000) 
 
1990-1992 
I 
AGRICULTURAL 
VALUE ADDED 
PER WORKER 
($2000) 
 
2001-2003 
J 
AGRICULTURAL 
VALUE ADDED 
PERCENTAGE OF 
GDP 
 
2006 
1 ALGERIA 5.00 1,911 2,067 8 
2 ANGOLA 11.10 183 160 7 
3 BENIN 3.80 368 578 32 
4 BOTSWANA - - - - 
5 BURKINA FASO 5.70 143 163 - 
6 BURUNDI 2.50 110 80 35 
7 CAMEROON 3.60 389 596 20 
8 CAPE VERDE - - - - 
9 CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUB. 
-0.60 290 407 54 
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10 CHAD 14.30 179 226 21 
11 COMOROS - - - - 
12 CONGO (DEM REP) 4.70 186 154 46 
13 CONG (REP.) 4.50 - - 04 
14 COTE D’ VOIRE 0.10 601 761 21 
15 DJIBOUTI - - - - 
16 EGYPT 4.00 1531 1975 15 
17 EQUAT. GINEA - - - - 
18 ERITREA 2.70 - 64 17 
19 ETHIOPIA 5.70 - 149 48 
20 GABON - - - - 
21 GAMBIA - - - - 
22 GHANA 5.30 302 331 38 
23 GUINEA 2.90 149 193 13 
24 GUINEA BISSAU - - - - 
25 KENYA 3.80 335 327 28 
26 LESOTHO - - - - 
27 LIBERIA - - - - 
28 LIBYA - - - - 
29 MADAGASCAR 2.70 187 179 28 
30 MALAWI 4.10 72 130 36 
31 MALI 5.70 204 227 37 
32 MAURITANIA 5.00 574 385 17 
33 MAURITIUS - - - - 
34 MAYOTTE - - - - 
35 MOROCCO 4.40 1,438 1515 17 
36 MOZAMBIQUE 8.20 108 137 22 
37 NAMIBIA 4.70 811 1057 11 
38 NIGER 3.70 170 172 - 
39 NIGERIA 5.90 592 843 23 
40 RWANDA 5.10 192 222 41 
41 SAOT. & PRINC. - - - - 
42 SENEGAL 4.50 249 249 18 
43 SEYCHLLES - - - - 
44 SIERRA LEONE 12.30 - - 47 
45 SOMALIA - - - - 
46 SOUTH  AFRICA 4.10 1796 2391 3 
47 SUDAN 6.90 346 707 31 
48 SWAZILAND - - - - 
49 TANZANIA 6.50 245 283 45 
50 TOGO 2.30 354 404 44 
51 TUNISIA 4.60 2,431 2,431 11 
52 UGANDA 5.60 187 230 32 
53 ZAIRE - - - - 
54 ZAMBIA 4.90 161 205 16 
55 ZIMBABWE -5.60 244 266 
22 
NOTES: NA= North Africa; EA = East Africa; WA= West Africa; CA = 
Central Africa; SA = South Africa; LI= Low Income; LMI = Low Middle 
Income; UMI = Upper Middle Income. 
SOURCES: World Development Report (2008) 
United Nations Human Development Reports. 
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Here, the prevalence of Child Malnutrition is the percentage of children 
under five whose weight for age is less than minus two standard 
deviations from the median for the international reference population ages 
0-59 months. The reference population, adopted by the World Health 
Organization (1983) is based on children from the United States, who are 
assumed to be well nourished and estimates of child malnutrition are from 
national survey data. The proportion of children who are underweight is 
the most common indicator of malnutrition and being underweight (even 
mildly) increases the risk of death and inhibits cognitive development in 
children. However, it perpetuates the problem from one generation to the 
next, as malnourished women are more likely to have low-birth- weight 
babies. Gross domestic product (GDP) is gross value added at purchasers 
prices, by all resident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without deducting for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion or 
degradation of natural resources. Value added is the output of an industry 
after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs; and the 
industrial origin of value added is determined by the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision. The report conventionally 
uses the United States dollar and applied the average official exchange 
rate reported by the International Monetary fund for the year shown; and 
an alternative conversion factor is applied if the official exchange rate is 
judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate 
effectively applied to transactions in foreign currencies and traded 
products. Again, Gross domestic product average annual growth rate is 
calculated from constant price GDP data in Local currency. Here, 
agricultural productivity refers to the ratio of agricultural value added, 
measured in constant 1995 United States dollars, to the number of 
workers in agriculture. Value added is the net output of an industry after 
adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. However, the 
industrial origin of value added is determined by the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision three. On the other hand, 
Agriculture value added corresponds to ISIC divisions one to five and 
includes forestry and fishing. 
From the beginning, the fiscal relationship in Nigeria involved only 
two levels of government: Central government and local authorities 
(native authorities). However, the power to raise tax was vested in the 
central government and the native authorities were given complete 
freedom of disbursement of their own share. Until 1913, this pattern of 
fiscal relationship remained in force and subsequently. The native 
authorities were allowed to retain fifty percent of general tax revenue and 
then pay over the balance of fifty percent to the government treasury. 
Again, the conference of residents and the central governments (1926-
1929) debated the tax position on ground. However, the then secretary of 
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state refused to amend the law and thus the right over taxation was 
retained for the central government. Yet, in 1929, the principle of 
deviation was implicitly introduced into the revenue allocation formula in 
Nigeria. And between 1933 and 1934, the share of native authorities that 
were classified as fully organized was reduced drastically; and therefore in 
1935, Sir John Maybin (Nigerian government administrator) introduced the 
concession of the principle of need or even development into the revenue 
sharing formula in the country. However, Sir Bernard Bourdillion (1935-
1939) criticized the principle of deviation (allocation) based on the degree 
of organization on the grounds that it made for uneven development. 
Subsequently, various developments in revenue allocation 
principles evolved in Nigeria. In 1947/48 (Unitary system). The fiscal 
commissioners (Sir Sydney Phillipson and S.O. Adebo) made some 
recommendation while deviation and even progress were the acceptable 
principles. In 1952/53 (Quasi Federal System), the fiscal commissioners 
were Prof. J.R. Hicks, Sir Sydney Phillipson and D. Sketton. They made 
recommendations while deviation, need and national interest were the 
accepted principles. Yet, in 1954/58 (federal system), the fiscal 
commissioner was Sir Louis Chick. He made several fiscal 
recommendations and the accepted principles were derivation and fiscal 
independence. In 1959/60 (federal system), the fiscal commissioners were 
Sir J. Raisman and Prof R. Tress. They made several recommendations 
and the accepted principles were derivation, national unity and fiscal 
independence.  
Again, in 1964/67 (Federal system) Mr. H. Bin (Fiscal 
commissioner) made several recommendations and the acceptable 
principles were derivation fiscal independence, National interest, East 
(30%), North (42%), Mid west (8%) and West (20%). In 1968 (federal 
system) Chief O. Dina committee made several recommendations and the 
acceptable principles were equality of states (50%) population (50%) and 
derivation. The federal military government also (1975/76) re-examined 
the fiscal position and the accepted principles were equality of states, 
population and derivation. In 1977, Prof A.O Aboyade fiscal technical 
committee made several recommendations and the accepted principles 
include equality of access to Development opportunities (25%); National 
Minimum Standard for National Integration (22%); Absorptive Capacity 
(20%); Independent Revenue and Minimum tax effort (18%); fiscal 
efficiency (15%); federal (60%); state joint A/c (30%); Local Govt (10%) 
and special Grants A/c(0%). 
In 1979, the Okigbo Presidential Commission was appointed in the 
light of the deliberations in the constituent assembly and terms of 
reference were offered. In keeping with the Nigerian constitution, the 
commission agreed to the federation account into which all federally 
collected revenues, expect the proceeds of taxes on the personal income 
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of the personnel of the Armed forces, the Nigeria police force, external 
affairs officers and residents of the federal capital territory, should be 
paid. However, it recommended that the constitution be amended to the 
effect that receipts accruing form the repayment of loans and sales of 
capital assets should not be regarded as revenue and therefore should not 
form part of the federation account. Additional fiscal recommendations 
were also made. Indeed, the recommendations of the commission were 
accepted and adopted with minor amendments by the National Assembly 
and signed into law in 1982. Here, the federation account was to be 
distributed among the three levels of government as follows: federal 
government (55%); state governments (35%) and local government 
councils 10%. Thus, the 35% share of state governments was applied as 
follows: equality of states (30.5%); ecological problems (1.0%); 
derivation principle (3.5%). The 3.5% allocation on the basis of derivation 
was sub-divided into 2.0% to directly accrue to states concerned in 
proportion to the value of minerals extracted from the territory of the 
states and 1.5% into a fund for the development of mineral producing 
areas of the country. These are in addition to other related fiscal 
modification. 
In fact, the system of revenue jurisdiction approved by the National 
assembly in 1982 remained unchanged up to year 2000. However what 
has been altered a number of times is the formula for distributing the 
federation Account. Specifically, in 1985, the military administration 
amended the allocation formula with the principal objective of relating the 
allocation on the basis of derivation to the total value of minerals 
extracted rather than to the total revenue in the federation account. 
Again, in 1989, an important institutional change was made and the 
military administration established a Revenue Mobilization Allocation and 
fiscal commission. The commission was empowered (among other 
assignments) to monitor the accruals to and disbursement of revenue 
from the federal Account. Again, the 1990 system of revenue allocation 
(as approved in 1982) was adopted without modification. In 1992, 
however, there was a review of the allocation formula involving a 
reduction of the federal government’s share in the federation account 
while the share of local government as well as special fund and ecological 
fund share were increased. Again, in 1995, the formula remained 
unchanged (as of 1992) with minor differences occurring in the structure 
and jurisdiction of revenue. 
Significantly, in 1994, sales tax was replaced by the value-added 
tax (VAT) in an attempt to ensure that the state government adopted 
uniform rates and to enhance receipts. Here, the FGN assured 
responsibility for the administration and collection of the VAT proceeds the 
sharing formula was 20:50:30 and early, 1995 (50:25:25) and much later 
(4:35:25). However, section 162 of the 1999 constitution reserves for the 
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National Assembly, the power to determine the formula for allocating the 
federation account, taking into account the principles of population, 
equality of state, internal revenue generation, landmass, terrain   as well 
as population density, provided that the principle of derivation shall be 
constantly reflected in the formula as being not less than 13% of the 
revenue accruing to the federation account directly from any natural 
resources. However, pending the determination of the system by the 
national Assembly, the Nigerian constitution provides that the system of 
revenue allocation in force in the fiscal year should apply. Here, the 
distribution of revenue among the states and local governments was 
based on the following principles and weights as approved by the national 
assembly: equality of states and local governments (40%), population of 
states and local governments (30%), social development factor (10%), 
land mass/terrain (10%) and internal revenue effort (10%). 
The expenditure assignment in Nigeria (as provided in the 
constitution) include Defence  (F), foreign affair (F), Immigration (F) 
International trade (F), money and banking (F), Environment (F/S), Air 
and Rail (F), industry and agriculture (F/S), education (F/S/L), health 
(F/S/L), Police (F) and Highways (F/S/L). On the other hand, the tax 
assignment (Legislation/ administrative collection) include personal 
income tax (F/F,S); companies income tax (F/F); withholding tax (F/F,S);  
Resource Tax (Petroleum, solid mineral) and customs (import and export 
duties) (F/F); VAT (F/F); Education tax (F/F); Capital gains, tax (F/F,S) 
Stamp duties (F/F,S); pools betting and lotteries (S/S); Road taxes (S/S); 
Business taxes (S/S); Development levy (S/S); Land (S/S,L); Market taxes 
(S/S,L); Naming of Streets (S/L); property (tenement rates) (L/L); Estates 
(S/S); Entertainment (L/L); Advertisement (L/L); Fees (Birth marriage, 
death registration, motor parks, driver’s license, shops, liquor license, 
slaughter slap) (L/L); Gifts tax (S/S) and capital  transfer (S/S). 
Recently, the fiscal responsibility Act 2007 of Nigeria was enacted. 
It was an act to provide for prudent management of the nations 
resources, ensure long term macro-economic stability of the national 
economy, secure greater accountability and transparency in fiscal 
operations within a medium term fiscal policy framework, and the 
establishment of the fiscal responsibility commission to ensure the 
promotion and enforcement of the nation’s economic objectives and for 
related matters. A major component of this act is that the federal 
government shall ensure that its fiscal and financial affairs are conducted 
in a transparent manner and accordingly ensure full and timely disclosure 
and wide publication of all transactions and decisions involving public 
revenues and expenditures and their implications for its finances. Equally, 
the National Assembly shall ensure transparency during the preparation 
and discussion of the medium term expenditure framework, annual 
budget and the appropriation bill. Again, the Federal Government may 
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provide technical and financial assistance to states and local governments 
that adopt similar fiscal responsibility legislation along the same lines as 
this Act for the modernization of their respective tax, financial and asset 
administration. In addition to any other power, conferred on him under 
this act, the president shall make regulations generally for the purposes of 
carrying into effect the provisions of this act. 
Currently, Nigeria operates a federal political economy (federalism) 
implying a series of legal administrative relationships established among 
units of government possessing varying degrees of real authority and 
jurisdictional autonomy. However, the Nigerian federal system has 
metamorphosed from a two-tier federal arrangement comprising three 
unequal regions to a three-tier federal system of thirty-six states, one 
federal capital territory and seven hundred and seventy-four local 
government, each of which is constitutionally recognized. Unfortunately, 
there has been increasing wave of discordant voices from state and local 
governments over revenue allocation in the country; and this suggests 
that appropriate balance is yet to be struck in the use of revenue 
allocation to correct the imbalance between responsibilities and revenue 
powers at the lower levels of government. Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 show 
the various local, state and federal finances in Nigeria. 
 
TABLE 8.4 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES: NIGERIA 
DATA 
A B 
Total 
Federal  
Collected 
Revenue 
N Million  
C 
Oil 
Revenue  
N 
Millions  
D 
Non Oil 
Revenue N 
Millions  
E 
Federation 
Account 
N 
Millions  
F 
Federal 
Government 
Retained 
Revenue N 
Millions  
G 
Total 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
H 
Recurrent 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
I 
Current 
Surplus 
(f) 
Deficit (-
) 
1970 634.0 166.6 467.4 582.4 448.8 903.9 716.1 187.8 
1971 1168.8 510.1 658.7 1068.6 1168.8 997.2 823.6 173.6 
1972 1405.1 764.3 640.8 1325.8 1404.8 1463.6 1012.3 451.3 
1973 1695.3 1016.0 679.3 1613.0 1695.3 1529.2 963.5 565.7 
1974 4537.4 3724.0 813.4 4371.1 4537.0 2740.8 1517.1 1223.5 
1975 5514.7 4271.5 1,243.2 5294.1 5514.7 5942.6 2734.9 3207.7 
1976 6765.9 5365.2 1,400.7 6470.1 6765.9 7856.7 3815.4 4041.3 
1977 8042.4 1749.8 1961.8 7703.1 8042.4 8823.8 3819.2 5004.6 
1978 7371.0 4555.8 2815.2 6781.4 5178.1 8000.0 2800.0 5200.0 
1979 10912.4 8880.8 2031.6 10599.8 8868.4 7406.7 3187.2 4219.5 
1980 15233.5 12353.3 2880.2 14746.5 12993.3 14968.5 4805.2 10163.3 
1981 13290.5 8564.4 4726.1 10182.8 7511.6 11413.7 4846.7 6567.0 
1982 11433.7 7814.9 3618.8 9884.9 5819.1 11923.2 5506.0 6417.2 
1983 10506.7 7253.0 3255.7 9798.6 6272.0 9636.5 4750.8 4885.7 
1984 11253.3 8269.2 2984.1 10672.4 7267.2 9927.6 5827.5 4100 
1985 15050.4 10923.7 4126.7 13750.2 10001.4 13041.1 7576.4 5464.7 
1986 12595.8 8107.3 4488.5 11,868.3 7969.4 16223.7 7696.9 8526.8 
1987 25380.6 19027.0 6353.6 24692.2 16129.0 22018.7 15646.2 6372.5 
1988 27596.7 19831.7 7765.0 26770.3 15588.6 27749.5 19409.4 8340.1 
1989 53,870.4 39130.5 14739.9 46860.3 25893.6 41028.3 25994.2 15034.1 
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1990 98102.4 71887.1 26,215.3 68064.2 38152.1 60268.2 36219.6 24048.6 
1991 100991.6 82666.4 18325.2 54000.0 30829.2 66584.4 38243.5 28340.9 
1992 190453.2 164078.1 26375.1 77800.0 53264.9 92797.4 53034.1 39763.3 
1993 192769.4 162102.4 30667.0 106799.4 126071.2 191228.9 136727.1 54,501.8 
1994 201910.8 160192.4 41718.4 110461.0 90622.6 160893.2 89974.9 70913.3 
1995 459987.3 324527.6 135439.7 161988.9 249768.1 248766.1 127679.8 121138.3 
1996 523597.0 408783.0 114814.0 179000.0 325144.0 337217.6 124491.3 212926.3 
1997 582811.1 416811.1 166000.0 208000.0 351262.3 428215.2 158563.5 269651.7 
1998 463608.8 324311.2 139297.6 257331.4 353724.1 487113.4 178097.8 309015.6 
1999 949187.9 724422.5 224765.4 576801.4 662585.3 947690 449662.4 498027.6 
2000 1906.2 1591.7 314.5 1262.5 597.3 701.1 461.6 239.5 
2001 2231.6 1707.6 903.5 1427.4 797.0 1018.0 579.3 438.7 
2002 1731.8 1230.9 501.0 1606.1 716.8 1018.2 696.8 321.4 
2003 2575.1 2074.3 500.8 2011.6 1023.2 1226.0 984.3 241.7 
2004 3920.5 3354.8 565.7 2657.2 1253.6 1426.2 1032.7 351.3 
2005 5547.5 4762.4 785.1 2033.9 1660.7 1822.1 1223.7 519.5 
2006 5965.1 5287.6 677.5 3219.1 1836.6 1938.0 1290.2 552.4 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.4 Cont. 
 
A J 
Current 
Surplus 
(F) Deficit 
(-) 
L  
Percentage 
Of GDP 
(%) 
K 
Overall 
Surplus (f) 
Deficit (-) 
N Millions  
M 
Percentage 
of GDP 
(%) 
N 
Financing 
N Millions  
O 
Foreign 
*Net) N 
Millions  
P 
Banking 
System 
(Net) 
N 
Millions  
Q 
Domestic 
(Net) 
N 
millions  
R 
Other 
funds N 
Millions  
1970 -267.3 -5.1 -455.1 -8.8 455.1 1.0 165.6 227.4 226.7 
1971 345.2 5.3 171.6 2.6 -171.6 40.9 276.0 300.1 -512.6 
1972 392.5 5.4 -58.8 -0.8 58.8 40.9 6.3 0.3 17.6 
1973 731.8 6.7 166.1 1.5 -166.1 48.9 28.5 60.5 -275.5 
1974 3019.9 16.5 1796.4 9.8 -1796.4 45.5 188.5 242.3 -2084.2 
1975 2779.8 12.9 -427.9 -2.0 437.9 27.5 362.9 453.0 -52.6 
1976 2950.5 10.8 -1090.8 -4.0 1090.8 24.5 620 1041.3 25.0 
1977 4223.2 12.9 -761.4 -2.4 781.4 -0.5 1599.8 1886.3 -1095.4 
1978 2378.1 6.6 -2821.9 -7.8 2821.9 1500.0 1250.5 1582.5 -260.6 
1979 5681.2 13.2 1461.7 3.4 -1461.7 363.8 101.8 729.0 -2554.5 
1980 8188.1 16.1 -1975.2 -3.9 1975.2 255.3 150.7 387.1 1332.8 
1981 2664.9 2.6 -3902.1 -3.8 3902.1 464.4 3018.0 4200.8 -763.1 
1982 313.1 0.5 -6104.1 -5.5 6104.1 263.5 3989.2 3402.0 2438.6 
1983 -1521.2 1.3 -3364.5 -2.8 3364.5 1106.9 5296.3 7057.0 -4799.4 
1984 1439.7 1.2 -2660.4 -2.1 2660.4 1184.5 2370.0 2928.2 -1452.3 
1985 2425.0 1.7 -3039.7 -2.1 3039.7 1045.9 785.6 571.2 1422.6 
1986 272.5 0.2 -8254.3 -5.7 8254.3 708.1 475.2 475.5 7070.7 
1987 482.8 0.2 -5889.7 -2.9 5889.7 832.7 2809.7 6465.6 -1408.6 
1988 -3820.8 -1.4 -12160.9 -4.4 12160.9 1918.7 6102.4 8361.8 1880.4 
1989 -10326.0 -2.6 -15134.7 -3.7 15134.7 5719.0 -9236.4 -5797.8 15213.5 
1990 1932.5 0.4 -22116.1 -4.4 22116.1 980.6 2727.7 6092.6 15042.9 
1991 -7414.3 -1.3 -36755.2 -6.2 35755.2 2972.6 31107.1 32112.4 670.2 
1992 230.8 0.0 -39532.5 -4.3 39532.5 -11859.6 33598.9 46716.7 4675.4 
1993 -53233.5 4.7 -107735.3 -9.5 107735.3 16963.5 89402.0 91136.0 -364.2 
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1994 647.7 0.0 -70270.6 -4.8 70270.6 8390.8 40900.1 60247.6 1632.2 
1995 122138.3 4.1 1000.0 0.0 -1.000.0 22455.4 17819.6 7102.2 -30557.6 
1996 244975.7 5.9 32049.4 0.8 -37049.4 7825.4 -
153143.2 
-32049.4 103314.7 
1997 264651.7 6.2 -5.000 -0.1 5000.0 13382.6 -62889.5 -8382.6 52254.5 
1998 175626.3 4.3 -133389.3 -3.3 133389.3 16605.6 108990.5 116783.7 12898.0 
1999 212922.9 4.4 -285104.7 -5.9 285104.7 21040.8 172638.1 264065.9 109986.5 
2000 135.7 0.0 -103777.3 -1.5 103777.3 0.0 73137.0 103447.3 330.0 
2001 217.6 0.0 -221048.9 -3.1 221048.9 0.0 136734.1 118720.0 102328.9 
2002 20.0 0.0 -301401.6 -3.8 301401.6 0.0 60794.5 149026.7 152374.9 
2003 39.0 0.0 -202724.7 -2.0 202746.4 0.0 134246.4 163746.4 39000.0 
2004 220.8 0.0 -172601.3 -1.5 172620.0 0.0 0.0 45500.0 126120.0 
2005 437.0 0.0 -161406.3 -1.1 161400.0 0.0 0.0 143500.0 17900.0 
2006 546.4 0.0 -101397.5 -0.6 101251.4 0.0 0.0 45000.0 56251.4 
 Notes: Recurrent expenditure includes interest payments on debt service, 
other transfers and extra-budgetary items. Capital expenditure includes capital 
repayments on debt service, other transfers and net-lending. Other funds include 
public, special and trust funds, treasury clearance funds, excess reserves and so 
on. 
Sources: CBN statistical bulletin (2006) NBS Annual Abstract of Statistics (2006) 
 
TABLE 8.5 STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES: NIGERIAN 
STATES/FCT DATA 
 
A B 
Current 
Revenue 
N 
Millions  
C 
Federation 
Account 
N millions  
D 
Value 
Added 
Tax N 
Millions  
E 
Internal 
Revenue 
N Millions  
F  
Grants 
others N 
Millions  
G 
Stabilization  
Fund 
Receipts N 
Millions  
H 
Recurrent 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
I  
Current 
Surplus 
(+) 
Deficits 
N 
Millions  
J 
Capital 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
1980 3817.1 3695.4 - 121.7 0.0 - 2917.8 899.3 4316.0 
1981 4874.8 3825.6 - 142.6 906.6 - 4611.0 263.8 6379.9 
1982 4561.5 3245.7 - 74.9 1240.9 - 4733.9 -172.4 5946.6 
1983 4329.4 2958.5 - 38.0 1332.9 - 5262.1 -932.7 5828.8 
1984 4400.9 2722.0 - 58.8 1620.1 - 4590.6 -189.7 2474.3 
1985 4844.9 3260.8 - 1584.1 - - 4823.1 21.8 1034.0 
1986 4704.4 2843.8 - 1860.6 - - 4601.0 103.4 1173.7 
1987 8151.6 6197.1 - 1954.5 - - 5721.2 2430.4 2542.3 
1988 10360.1 8181.3 - 2178.8 - - 7193.4 3166.7 3585.1 
1989 11502.1 9899.8 - 1602.3 - - 8140.6 3361.5 4824.1 
1990 19967.4 16378.8 - 2761.7 670.5 156.4 13387.5 6579.9 6661.8 
1991 24772.2 19742.2 - 3181.2 1382.0 466.8 15872.3 8899.9 11151.4 
1992 32673.6 24497.3 - 5244.7 957.3 1974.3 20780.3 11893.3 16280.3 
1993 37740.6 27660.6 - 5726.2 1622.5 2731.3 29799.0 7941.6 14381.7 
1994 49506.1 29006.8 5026.0 10929.8 3478.3 1065.2 37772.2 11733.9 18144.0 
1995 69641.7 38671.5 6556.9 16993.0 7284.0 436.2 53152.0 16489.7 24743.1 
1996 89529.1 41493.0 11286.0 19467.0 16652.3 630.8 54825.0 34704.1 29162.6 
1997 96962.6 50902.5 13905.3 27368.2 4337.3 449.3 58956.2 38006.4 33730.0 
1998 143202.5 66067.1 16206.8 29213.9 31477.8 236.9 75124.7 66077.8 68648.9 
1999 168990.1 103657.3 23750.5 34109.0 6551.7 921.6 102690.1 66300.0 60430.9 
 69 
2000 359072.1 251570.0 30643.8 37788.5 33289.3 5780.5 196784.1 162288.0 158895.6 
2001 573548.2 404094.0 44912.9 59416.0 58064.4 7060.9 294709.5 278838.7 235241.7 
2002 669817.7 388294.7 52632.0 89606.9 129714.4 9569.7 424195.4 245622.3 283473.8 
2003 854997.1 535179.9 65887.6 118753.5 134179.3 996.8 545308.7 309688.4 324019.9 
2004 1113943.7 777208.0 96195.6 134195.3 104344.8 2000.0 556812.3 557131.4 412926.2 
2005 1419637.0 920985.9 87449.8 122737.8 137445.3 10775.3 789127.4 630509.6 514724.7 
2006 1543770.1 1016078.2 110566.8 125228.9 125323.1 11885.2 894323.9 649446.2 583976.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.5 cont. 
A K 
Total 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
L 
Overall 
Surplus 
(+) 
Deficit (-) 
M 
Financing 
N 
Millions  
N 
Internal 
Loans N 
Millions  
O 
External 
Loans N 
Millions  
P 
Opening 
Cash 
Balance N 
Millions  
Q 
Other 
funds N 
millions  
R 
Share of 
Excess 
Crude N 
Millions  
S 
Extra 
Budgetary 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
1980 7233.8 -3416.7 3417.3 728.6 433.6 - 2255.1 - - 
1981 10990.9 -6116.1 6116.1 558.9 1167.4 - 4389.8 - - 
1982 10680.5 -6119.0 6119.0 546.8 1331.2 - 4241.0 - - 
1983 11090.9 -6761.5 6761.5 -737.0 1652.8 - 5845.7 - - 
1984 7064.9 -2664.0 2664.0 446.9 1318.2 - 898.9 - - 
1985 5857.1 -1012.2 1012.2 487.5 - - 524.7 - - 
1986 5774.7 -1070.3 1070.3 1343.3 - - -273.0 - - 
1987 8263.5 -111.9 111.9 3739.4 - - -3627.5 - - 
1988 10778.5 -418.4 418.4 973.7 - - -555.3 - - 
1989 12974.7 -1472.6 1472.6 2064.5 - - -519.9 - - 
1990 20049.3 -81.9 81.9 158.0 795.2 - -871.3 - - 
1991 27023.7 -2251.5 2251.5 350.8 102.5 - 1798.2 - - 
1992 37060.6 -4387.0 4387.0 986.9 1678.1 - 1722.0 - - 
1993 44180.9 -6440.3 6440.3 218.3 2214.8 - 4007.2  - 
1994 55916.0 -6409.9 6410.3 979.8 3962.2 - 1468.3 - - 
1995 77895.5 -8253.8 8253.9 2723.6 1641.3 - 3889.0 - - 
1996 83987.0 5542.1 -5540.9 131.6 2595.0 - -8267.5 - - 
1997 92686.0 4276.6 -4276.3 180.0 191.8 - -4648.1 - - 
1998 143168.8 33.7 -33.7 4149.2 246.0 - -4428.9 - 4359.2 
1999 167896.0 1094.1 -1094.0 4479.9 295.2 - -5869.1 - 4775.1 
2000 359670.6 -598.5 598.2 3834.9 156.0 - -3392.7 - 3990.9 
2001 596956.4 -23408.2 23408.2 19232.1 1410.2 4936.8 -2170.9 - 67005.2 
2002 724537.2 -54719.5 54719.5 32451.7 15879.3 5092.0 1296.5 - 16868.0 
2003 921159.7 -66162.6 66162.6 71030.9 14680.4 13005.0 -32553.7 - 51831.1 
2004 1125057.0 11113.3 11113.3 4396.9 - - 6716.4 - 155318.5 
2005 1478585.4 58948.4 58948.4 22557.1 - 33255.6 3135.7 140242.9 174733.3 
2006 1586796.6 43026.5 43026.5 26954.0 - 14262.3 1810.2 154687.9 108496.3 
 
NOTES: Federation Account implies statutory allocation (gross) 
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     Internal Loans include capital receipts for 1986-1989 
           FCT means Federal Capital Territory 
 
Sources: CBN Annual Reports for various years 
      CBN Statistical bulletin (2006) 
              NBS Annual abstract of statistics (2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8.6 GOVERNMENT FINANCES: NIGERIAN LGA DATA 
 
A B 
Current 
Revenue 
N 
Millions  
C 
Federation 
Account 
N millions  
D 
State 
Allocation 
N million  
E 
Value 
Added 
Tax N 
Millions  
F  
Internal 
Revenue 
N 
Millions  
G 
Grants 
Expenditure 
N millions  
H 
Recurrent 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
I  
Current 
Surplus 
(+) 
Deficits 
N 
Millions  
J 
Capital 
Expenditure 
N Millions  
1993 19874.5 18316.4 253.1 0.0 1035.6 269.4 13966.5 5908.0 5508.8 
1994 19223.1 17321.3 466.4 0.0 1205.9 229.5 14884.2 4338.9 4082.9 
1995 24412.7 17875.5 625.4 3558.1 2110.8 242.9 16317.2 8095.5 6126.1 
1996 23789.6 17586.5 685.1 3306.9 2211.1 0.0 16620.1 7169.5 6045.5 
1997 31254.4 20443.3 578.9 7586.1 2506.9 139.2 21856.5 9397.9 8083.4 
1998 44948.2 30600.9 750.4 10170.8 3331,6 94.5 29192.2 15756.0 14864.7 
1999 60800.6 43870.3 419.8 9559.8 4683.8 2266.9 41613.9 19186.7 18827.3 
2000 151877.3 118589.4 1923.1 13908.7 7152.9 10303.2 93899.9 57977.4 59964.9 
2001 171523.1 128500.5 1598.6 20102.7 6020.4 15300.9 122712.7 48810.4 48661.8 
2002 172151.1 128896.7 1672.3 18727.2 10420.8 12434.1 124701.6 47449.5 45118.6 
2003 370170.9 291406.9 2119.8 39648.4 20175.5 16820.3 211633.0 158537.9 150080.2 
2004 468295.2 375656.3 3625.7 45985.2 22407.8 20620.2 295654.7 172640.5 165395.9 
2005 597219.1 493000.3 2343.9 55793.6 24042.5 21138.8 374514.6 222704.5 213463.2 
2006 674255.7 550796.3 3434.8 75920.0 23225.1 20879.5 398181.2 276074.5 267656.7 
 
A K 
Total 
Expenditure N 
Millions  
L 
Overall Surplus (+) 
Deficit (-) N 
Millions  
M 
Financing N Millions  
N 
Loans N 
Millions  
O 
Opening Cash 
Balance N 
Millions  
P 
Other Funds N 
Millions  
1993 19475.3 399.2 -399.2 39.9 - -439.1 
1994 18967.1 256.0 -256.0 71.5 - -327.5 
1995 22443.3 1969.4 -1969.4 50.5 - -2019.9 
1996 22665.6 1124.0 -1124.0 -11.0 - -1124.0 
1997 29939.9 1314.5 -1314.5 -1519.1 - -1519.1 
1998 44056.9 891.3 -891.3 2888.9 523.0 2356.9 
1999 60441.2 359.4 -359.4 259.6 2499.4 -3118.4 
2000 153864.8 -1987.5 1987.5 3734.6 3356.0 -5103.1 
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2001 171374.5 148.6 -148.6 - 3756.3 -3904.8 
2002 169820.2 2330.9 -2330.9 - 4928.1 -7259.0 
2003 361713.2 8457.7 -8457.7 - 6805.4 -15213.1 
2004 461050.6 7244.6 -7244.6 - 8714.4 -15958.9 
2005 587977.8 9241.3 -9241.3 - 51707.2 -58283.7 
2006 665838.0 8417.8 -8417.8 - -20560.1 12142.3 
Notes: Grants and others include stabilization fund and general ecology 
Sources: CBN Annual Reports and statement of accounts 
                CBN Statistical Bulletin (2006)  
                NBS Annual Abstract of Statistics (2006)  
 
In particular, the state governments are seriously questioning the 
recent diminution in their share of the federation account while the local 
governments are complaining that the likes in their share of the federation 
account have not kept pace with the additional responsibilities assigned to 
them (with, special reference to primary education and primary health 
care). In fact, the share of the federal government is still believed to be 
on the high side given the view that it has surplus funds that is wasteful, 
as it has an almost limitless capacity to donate large sums of money (to 
questionable causes). However, empirical evidence has shown that 
government in Nigeria is characterized by chronic corruption (Nwaobi, 
2004). Indeed, budget experts have identified that Nigeria’s budget that is 
not implemented can be blamed on public servants and this has retarded 
development. In other words, unimplemented budgets mean unspent 
funds, which imply money in the vaults of these government offices. Here, 
the operational method is to deliberately delay the award of contracts 
knowing fully well that in the next budget, they would encourage the 
contractors to come for variation. Unfortunately, these public servants 
have perfected the act so well that even the most eagle-eyed investigator 
would certainly meet brick wall while trying to unravel anything against 
them. This is because public servants hide under the pretext of bank loan 
as the only source of revenue to finance many of their multi-million naira 
estate projects. But in actuality, there is no loan collected.  
As a remedy, when federal government of Nigeria came out with the 
due process policy, it was aimed at eliminating contract inflation through 
encouraging competitive bidding of any government establishment was 
mandated to establish an in-house tenders’ board to handle contract 
bidding. But no sooner had this policy was distorted. Rather, what takes 
place in the in-house tenders’ board is a mere writing of quotation by 
whoever that is in charge for the sake of auditing. The conventional thing 
is where all the five or so biddings are written by one person in such a 
way that every other quotation would be disqualified based on laid down 
criteria with the exception of that of the establishment interest. In other 
words, many of the biddings that are published everyday with taxpayers’ 
money in the dailies are just to fulfill the requirement for due process 
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policy. In fact, the contract has already been concluded before 
publication, specifically, in the 2008 budget, the Nigeria government 
proposed to spend the sum of N94.36 billion to improve and develop the 
transport sector, N89.95 billion for agriculture (water) resources and N3.4 
billion for cooperative (community) tractor services. The government also 
voted N114.4 billion for the completion of the thirty-two on-going power 
transmission projects (and rehabilitation) of key power stations nation 
wide, as well as N210.45 for education. But despite the huge sum of 
money voted in the budget for road rehabilitation and maintenance, the 
state of the nations’ roads are appalling while the supply of electricity 
remained epileptic. Also, the level of unemployment is rather getting 
worse as some companies which could not operate in the difficult terrain 
of the Nigerian environment are closing shops. Consequently, 
infrastructure has placed the Nigeria manufacturers on a services 
competitive disadvantaged position in the global market place, leading to 
huge dumping of goods from countries with lower production costs. Again, 
in a celebrated case letter dated October 19. 2008, addressed to the 
speaker, house off representatives (Bankole) and distributed to all 
members of the house titled “Open Request for Explanation regarding 
allegation of fraud in the House”, the head of chambers (Keyamo) said 
that Nigerians deserve to know how complicit or otherwise the speaker 
was in the alleged fraud (Car purchases misappropriations scandal). 
Unfortunately, this issue is unresolved to date. 
At his independence broad cast to the nation (October 1, 2008) the 
Nigerian president said that he has saved over N400 billion from unspent 
capital releases to ministries, departments, and agencies, MDAs, in 2007. 
However, it was doubtful if the nation can harvest such huge amount at 
the end of 2008 fiscal year. Investigations revealed that contracts hitherto 
on the drawing board have suddenly been given out. In some cases, 
where contractors have not yet moved to site because they had not been 
mobilized, certificates haven been quickly raised and funds released to 
enable them move to site immediately. Essentially all these were to beat 
the statutory period for award of contracts within a financia l year. In other 
words, contracts within the sector are gradually growing in leaps and 
bounds, since no ministry or parastatal wants to return unspent money to 
the central purse. Again, the travails of Grange and Aduku (health ministry 
fraud) have taught ministries officials a lesson. They have devised a way 
of diverting the funds into projects without attracting the attention of the 
Economic and financial crimes commission or arousing the curiosity of the 
presidency. 
Yet, as the effects of the global financial meltdown begin to catch up 
with the Nigerian economy, governments at all levels are beginning to 
look at hitherto neglected sources of revenue to fund their budgets. In 
other words, the rapid crash in the crude oil prices from a peak of $147.27 
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in July 2008 to $61.92 per barrel in November 2008, has exploded every 
shared of optimism about ability of the Nigerian economy to withstand the 
pressure that the global economic meltdown has brought to bear on it 
consequently, the Nigerian president declared the new thinking of 
government at the recent international tax conference organized by the 
joint tax Board in Abuja. That is, for a nation to carry out basic functions 
of government pursue and implement its development programmes like 
the vision 2020 and the seven-point  agenda, it requires a stable, 
predictable and sustainable source of revenue. Consequently, this leaves 
Nigeria with no choice than to conform to international best practices and 
make taxation the primary source of revenue for the government. 
Furthermore, the need to seek alternative and more reliable source of 
revenue should be an imperative to the states and local government 
councils as the era of dependence on monthly allocations from the 
federation Account was over. However, driving the budget on taxes would 
work very well if we were in a country where the unemployment level is 
not as high as we have in Nigeria. It must be remembered that greater 
percentage of Nigerians that are unemployed will not pay taxes, as well as 
companies that are closed down. So how are the different tiers of 
government going to generate enough money to drive their billion and 
trillion naira budgets? This is a critical question that Nigerian leaders must 
thing through and find creative answers to. If not, Nigerians may become 
permanent victims of the global economic downturn. 
Similarly, in his 2009 budget speech, the Nigerian president maintained 
that the recent volatility of the oil price is apparent in the unprecedented 
decline of prices from record highs of about US $147/barrel in July, 2008 
to the price of about $50/ barrel in December, 2008, and there is no 
guarantee that prices will not further decline despite OPEC’s recent 
mitigating efforts. Therefore, the country must adopt a prudent outlook 
that does not invest misplaced confidence in the expectation of 
unrealistically high prices. In this respect, the federal government of 
Nigeria recently (in January 2009) inaugurated the presidential steering 
committee on the Global Economic Crisis. The task before the team is to 
respond as a team at the national level in a proactive manner in order to 
mitigate any potential effects of the current global economic and financial 
crisis on the Nigerian economy; to advise government and make 
recommendations on what measures that needs to be taken, both at the 
national, state and local government levels. The committee would not only 
mitigate the possible effects of the crisis on the Nigerian economy but 
would also enable the Nigerian economy to take advantages also of the 
opportunities offered by the global financial crisis. In other words, Nigeria 
must evolve and drive proactive response to the economic challenges in a 
holistic and coordinated manner; and the global crisis should be seen as 
an opportunity waiting to be exploited (and maximize). Indeed, given the 
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reality of the interdependence of the world economies, the national 
economy is clearly not immune from the adverse effects of the uncertainty 
and instability in international currency and commodity markets. Crude oil 
price swings portend adverse implications for the nation’s fiscal outlook. 
We are actually witnessing falling external reserves and marked 
depreciation of the naira. Here, efforts have been made to shore up 
investors confidence in the economy through appropriate budgetary 
interventions and requisite monetary policy.  Yet, in order to effectively 
strengthen the financial sector, protect the integrity of the financial 
markets and restore investor confidence in the economy, more 
comprehensive practical oriented measures need to be evolved. 
Indeed, poor national fiscal outlook also manifest at the state and local 
levels in Africa. For example, the fiscal induced poverty level in the Nnewi 
South local government of Anambra State of Nigeria remains unbearable. 
The local government in question is comprised of ten communities: 
Ukpor, Amichi, Ezinifite, Osumenyi, Unibi, Ekwulumili, Utuh, Ebenator, 
Azigbo and Akwaihedi. Here, agriculture which is the most predominant 
occupation in the area is practiced with crude implements and most 
farming households lack access to credit improved varieties and new 
technologies. Unemployment remains a problem in the area as graduates 
and young school leavers migrate to Urban, cities in search of 
employment opportunities. If poverty must be reduced and standard of 
living raised, it is then imperative that all developmental stake holders 
(Civil, local, state, national, regional and international agents) must adopt 
a well coordinated fiscal framework. 
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9.0 POLICY REFORM STRATEGIES 
Essentially, fiscal policy can have a direct impact on the poor, both 
through the government’s overall fiscal stance and through the 
distributional implications of tax policy and public spending. Here, 
structural fiscal reforms in budget treasury management, public 
administration, governance, transparency, and accountability can also 
benefit the citizens through inducing more efficient and better targeted 
use of public resources. However, there is no rigid, predetermined limit on 
what would be an appropriate fiscal deficit. Rather, this should be based 
on the particular circumstances facing a country; its medium-term 
macroeconomic outlook and the scope of external budgetary assistance 
with regard to the composition of public expenditure, policymakers need 
to assess not only the appropriateness of a proposed poverty reduction 
spending program but also of planned non-discretionary and discretionary 
no priority spending. They should take into consideration, the 
distributional and growth impact of spending in each area as well as 
placing due emphasis on spending programs that are pro-poor, such as 
certain programs in health, education and infrastructure; and on the 
efficient delivery of essential public services. 
 Consequently, an important medium-term objective for many 
developing countries will be to raise domestic revenue levels with a view 
to providing additional revenue in support of their development strategies. 
Thus, existing revenue base should be reviewed relative to its capacity to 
provide for the poverty spending requirements from nonblank domestic 
financing; and revenues should be raised in as economically neutral a 
manner as possible, while taking into consideration equity concerns and 
administrative capacities. Here, a broad-based consumption tax (such as 
VAT) preferably with a single rate, minimal exemptions and a threshold, 
should exclude smaller enterprises from taxation. Generally, the VAT 
should extend through the retail sector and should apply equally to 
domestic production and imported goods and services. It should also 
cover agricultural products and inputs, subject to a threshold that should 
exclude small farmers. 
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Taxes on international trade should play a minimal role; and import tariffs 
should have a low average rate and a limited dispersion of rates to reduce 
arbitrary and excessive rates of protection. Here, exemptions should be 
kept at a minimum and nontraiff barriers should be avoided altogether. 
Exporters should have duties rebated on imported inputs used for 
producing exports and export duties should generally be avoided. 
Similarly, the personal income tax should be characterized by only a few 
brackets and a moderate top marginal rate; by limited personal 
exemptions and deductions; by a standard exemption that excludes 
persons with low incomes and by extensive use of final withholding. 
However, the use of a simplified regime for small business and the 
informal sector may complement these major taxes. Yet tax policy should 
aim at moving toward a system of easily administered taxes with broad 
bases and moderate marginal rates. And to the extent that some revenue 
provisions may be regressive, they should be offset through the 
expenditure system. 
 If inflationary pressures from the fiscal stance are transmitted 
exclusively through the financing channel; they can be reduced without 
fiscal adjustment, if alternative sustainable source of financing (such as 
external financing) are available. However some fiscal adjustment is 
typically necessary because of the insufficient amount of alternative 
finance or that fiscal stance is putting upward pressure on prices through 
the aggregate demand channel. Conventionally, successful disinflation 
episodes have typically been accompanied by sizeable and sustained fiscal 
adjustment; and countries that wish to target a significantly lower rate of 
inflation need to ensure that the corresponding fiscal adjustment is 
adequate. Thus, aggregate fiscal policy is ideally embedded in a 
macroeconomic framework that ensures economic stability and promotes 
economic growth (World Bank, 2002). That is setting an aggregate level 
of spending that is consistent with the country. Overall macroeconomic 
goals and resource availability helps to promote stability and predictability 
in program financing over the medium term. 
 Indeed, a feasible and credible budget can be prepared only on the 
basis of accurate forecasts of economic growth and resource availability. 
Here, the intention should be to provide analysts with a broad 
understanding of the potential constraints facing budgetary decision 
makers and strategies for overcoming these constraints. Yet, a 
questionnaire like the public expenditure management diagnostic may be 
used to guide the analysis of institutional factors at the country level. 
Thus, the budget process can be portrayed as a cycle and idealized 
version as shown below. 
FINANCE MINISTRY SUPPORTED CABINET VERSION 
STEP A: Projecting Macroeconomic resources 
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STEP B: Setting of budgetary guidelines and expenditure ceilings 
MINISTRIES VERSION 
STEP C: Prepare line agency expenditure proposals 
 
FINANCE MINISTRY VERSION 
STEP D: Proposals appraised by MF and negotiated with line agencies to 
enable reconciliation of proposals 
 
STEP E: State budget prepared by MF 
 
CABINET VERSION 
STEP F: Budget approved by Cabinet and submit ted to parliament 
(National Assembly). 
 
PARLIAMENT/NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VERSION 
STEP G: Budget appropriations debated and approved by 
parliament/National Assembly. 
 
FINANCE MINISTRY VERSION 
STEP H: Funds released by MF and budget executed by line agencies  
 
 
 
SECTOR MINISTRIES VERSION 
STEP I: Accounts submitted by line agencies and complied by MF 
 
INDEPENDENT AUDITOR VERSION 
STEP J: Government accounts audited 
 
PARLIAMENT VERSION 
STEP K: Approval of audited accounts by parliament/National Assembly 
 However, the greatest challenge lies not in collecting information 
but in devising ways by which the information gathered can be used to 
support policy and managerial decisions. While managers will generally 
have discretion in how they use and respond to comments by the general 
public and service users, policy makers will prefer to base decisions on a 
sound quantitative base. But where the results of consultation exercises 
are intended for sub national levels of government, clear guidance should 
be provided on how this information can be integrated in routine planning 
and budgeting procedures. Again, while consultation provides decision 
makers with information, participation requires that citizens and the 
beneficiaries of services take an active role in resource management 
decisions. Traditionally, the budget process has been closed. That is, 
carried out within government under a veil of surely and revealed to the 
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public only after legislative approval. However, greater transparency in the 
budget process, as evidenced by the timely publication of public financial 
management information (budgets, accounts, and forward-planning 
documents such as the medium term expenditure framework) in a form 
that permits meaningful analysis; is a necessary precondition to greater 
participation. Yet, another precondition is allowing citizens to voice their 
concerns and priorities through the press, lobby groups and their 
representatives. 
 In fact, to foster participatory budget planning, it will be necessary 
to provide information to stakeholder so that they understand the budget 
process and how they can influence key decisions. In other words, it will 
be necessary to provide stakeholders with information on budget decisions 
after the passage of the budget. Thus, the government should open 
avenues for stakeholders to monitor actual expenditures to ensure 
correspondence between budget plans and actual budget execution. 
Therefore, the key to building a participatory budget planning system is 
facilitating the culture of open communication at various levels of 
government and among public officials, local political leaders and citizens 
groups. Because stakeholders will have diverse education and linguistic 
backgrounds, effective communication and information dissemination 
strategies about the budget process will often require radio broadcasts 
and printed materials in local languages. By more directly involving 
stakeholder groups, participatory budget planning can help boost public 
support for the local and national budget process, which in turn inc reases 
people’s willingness to voice their concerns about fiscal management and 
their budget priorities and improve communication among government 
officials political leaders and civic groups. Essentially, citizens are more 
likely to pay taxes once they understand the budget process and how 
their contributions are used to finance beneficial public services. Here, 
they must have confidence that minimal corruption exists in the local 
financial management system; and hence participatory budget planning 
can help to increase the local revenue base for public service provision. 
 Evaluation is a systematic examination of the relevance, operation 
and outcomes of programs and policies, compared to a set of explicit or 
implicit standards, intended to improve public actions. Basically, different 
types of evaluation address different evaluation questions and there 
questions can be broadly classified in three categories: process, outcome 
and reasons. The process questions aim to understand how the program 
or a specific component of it is being implemented as originally designed. 
However, the outcome questions seek to assess whether the situation of 
individuals or households in terms of key outcomes such as knowledge, 
behavior, well-being etc, has changed; and the extent to which the 
program is responsible for the observed changes. Outcomes may change 
for a number of reasons; and attribution questions ask whether observed 
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changes were caused by the program or whether they could have 
occurred anyway. Similarly, question about reasons aim to explore the 
reasons behind the observed process and outcomes. In other words, they 
ask how and why results were what they were. Consequently, these 
questions can be roughly matched by three major types of evaluation: 
process evaluation, outcome evaluation and theory-based evaluation. In 
turn, each type of evaluation has a menu of possible evaluation designs 
and data collection methods. Unlike the process and outcome evaluation, 
theory-based evaluations examine the links between inputs, activities and 
outcomes and aim to determine whether a breakdown has occurred and if 
so, where, why and how. They present an explicit or implicit theory about 
how and why a public action would work as a series of micro steps and 
analyze them sequentially to track the unfolding of assumption. By 
following the sequence of steps, this type of evaluation can determine if 
and where the process from program inputs to outcomes failed. 
 Indeed, by further reducing the protection of imports and the 
taxation of agricultural commodity exports can pose a fiscal dilemma for 
many agricultural based countries that depend on these revenues for 
public investment. In particular, for sub-Saharan Africa, trade taxes 
account for about a quarter of all government revenue. Thus, agriculture 
remains the dominant sector in most agriculture-based countries and so 
will have to continue to contribute to national and local government 
revenue (consistent with their current level of economic development). 
Consequently, four key principles to guide agricultural taxation remain 
valid. They should be nondiscriminatory; minimize efficiency losses; and 
consider the effectiveness of fiscal capture and capacity to implement. 
Again agriculture should not be taxed at a higher rate than other sectors, 
and agricultural taxes should be integrated with general value added, 
profit, and income taxes. Output and input taxes should be minimized; 
and land taxes can minimize efficiency losses and induce production. 
Output taxes can be replaced by consumption taxes (sales or value added 
taxes) in counties with the administrative capacity to implement them. 
However, the capacity to implement new systems will have to build over 
many years. Yet, in the interim, it may be necessary to rely partly on 
commodity and input taxes for revenue. 
 Further trade liberalization in developing countries may need to be 
sequenced with tax reforms to reduced tax losses from trade revenues 
and subsequent public investment in the agriculture sectors in the 
affected countries. Here, complementary policies and programs are 
needed to compensate losers in developing countries and to facilitate 
rapid and equitable adjustment to emerging comparative advantages. 
Again, supply response to trade reforms depends on public investments in 
core pubic goods such as irrigation, roads, research, and development, 
education, and associated institutional support. But public investments on 
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agriculture are often too squandered on regressive subsidies. Therefore, 
significant room remains for improving the efficiency of public resources 
by increasing investments on high-priority public goods. Thus, actions are 
needed to increase information, accountability and commitment. On the 
other hand, information gaps in public knowledge of budget allocations 
and impacts of public spending on agriculture have to be closed through 
greater publicity and transparency of budget allocation and evaluation. 
Similarly, political economy determines the pace and extent of reform and 
has to be addressed in both developed and developing countries. 
Therefore, building coalitions to support and sustain reforms can help. 
 However, the key elements of the future agenda are to continue to 
get prices right through trade and domestic policy reform; to ensure that 
the quality of public spending improves; to provide support to 
complementary programs to facilitate transitions; and to invest massively 
in core public goods for longer-term sustained growth. All these, requires 
a comprehensive approach beyond price and adjustment; and 
governments must therefore focus on improving market infrastructure 
institutions, and support services. In practice, addressing the political 
economy of agriculture-for-development agendas will continue to be 
difficult. Thus, a first political economy challenges is to give voice to pro-
farming coalitions in the agriculture-based countries that can mobilize 
public support for small holder-based agricultural growth. Similarly, a 
second political economy challenge is to avoid the subsidy and protection 
traps in addressing rural-Urban income disparities and poverty in the 
transforming and urbanized countries (by investing more in pubic goods 
and safety nets). Here, new private actors can add voice and political 
support to improve agricultural incentives. Yet, political and 
macroeconomic stability is necessary for agricultural growth and without 
stability; few other parts of an agricultural growth agenda can be 
implemented. However, strategies should reflect four objectives in a 
“policy diamond” that set priories in the agriculture-for-development 
agenda. 
 Essentially, the first objective is establishing efficient markets and 
value chains while the second is that of accelerating smallholder entry to 
agricultural markets and raising small-holder innovativeness and 
competitiveness. Next, is that of improving livelihoods and food security in 
subsistence agriculture and low-skilled rural occupations. And lastly, is 
that of increasing employment and investment opportunities in the rural 
economy while enhancing skills to allow the rural poor to seize these 
opportunities or to successfully migrate. Together, these objectives will 
drive the three pathways out of poverty (farming, rural employment and 
migration). On the other hand, the policy objectives for the transforming 
countries should differ drastically. Here, they should promote high-value 
activities to diversify smallholder farming away from land-intensive staples 
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as urban incomes rise and diets change. Extend the green revolution in 
food staples to areas by passed by technological progress and with large 
numbers of poor, including many of the extreme poor, and provide safety 
nets. Also, promote livestock activities among the landless and 
smallholders as a substitute for land. They should also provide 
infrastructure to support the diversification of agriculture and of rural 
economies; as well as promoting the rural nonfarm economy to confront 
the rural employment problem and invest massively in skills for people to 
migrate to the rapidly growing sectors of the economy. Yet, the policy 
agenda for urbanized countries are equally important. Here, they should 
include smallholders in the new food markets, which requires (among 
other instruments) greater access to land and skills for the new 
agriculture. They should improve productivity in subsistence agriculture 
and provide social assistance, together with payments for environmental 
services to create incentives for conservations. Similarly, they should 
follow a territorial approach to promote the rural nonfarm economy and 
enhance skills to give access to the jobs and investment opportunities 
offered by growth of the rural nonfarm economy. However, the nation 
state remains responsible for creating an enabling environment for the 
agriculture-for-development agenda, because of the fact that only the 
state can establish the fundamental conditions for the private sector and 
civil society to thrieve: macroeconomic stability, political stability, security 
and the rule of law. 
 Aligning agricultural strategies and policies with budget is important 
to avoid under investment and disinvestment. In real sense, investing is 
more challenging for agriculture-based countries, given the considerable 
financial resources required consequently, donor funding can help meet 
these requirements, but increasing the domestic revenue base and 
improving budget planning and management are national responsibilities. 
Medium-term expenditure frameworks based on program budgets with 
clear objectives, specific costing, and transparent planning, align financial 
resources with priorities. However, in transforming and urbanized 
countries, the challenge should often be to create political support for 
reallocating budgetary resources from unproductive and inequitable 
subsidies to more effective policy instruments. Indeed, policymakers and 
stakeholders at all levels (from local to global) have to make special 
efforts to seize these opportunities for realizing the agenda. Thus, sound 
agricultural development strategies require stronger capacity for policy 
analysis and evaluation, and a commitment to evidence-based policy 
making. But in a global world and on a small planet, there is considerable 
mutual interest in supporting every country’s agriculture-for-development 
agenda. In fact, meeting these challenges is ultimately a matter of equity 
and justice between North and South (and between present and future 
generations). 
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 For the promotion of the construction industry, government actions 
should include policies and legislation affecting licenses and permits, 
sanitary and building codes; minimum wages; corporate taxes; rules on 
the importation of materials and spare parts; and the terms and 
availability of financing for construction. Essentially, the taxation regime of 
a country can have an important effect on the development of the 
industry. Here, an incipient construction industry can be assisted by tax 
incentives, such as tax holidays; investment or reinvestment allowances; 
accelerated depreciation on equipment; and customs duties exemptions. 
However, such incentives must be temporary and cover only the formative 
period of the industry. In general, incentives can foster growth of the 
industry and can also promote the export of its services. Concurrently, 
and in order to increase earnings of foreign exchange, domestic 
construction firms should be exempted from business tax and be given tax 
credit against income and corporate taxes for all the foreign currency 
earned. Definitely, this will help in developing the country’s construction 
industry as well as success in exporting its services. Yet, in an 
internationally financed work, domestic contractors are often at a 
disadvantage because they have to bid on the basis of equipment for 
which they have paid full import duties; while foreign firms pay no such 
duty. Here, a possible solution to this problem would be to require that 
foreign contractors pay duty on the amount that the equipment 
depreciates over the contract period. Therefore, full duty could be 
collected at the time of importation and the balance (calculated on the 
residual value at the end of the contract) refunded upon re-export of the 
equipment. Differently, these foreign contractors could post a bond for the 
full value of the duty which could be redeemed after payment of duty on 
the value used in the contract and upon re-export. 
 Indeed, in the formulation of a comprehensive strategy for the 
construction industry; the main emphasis should be on civil works where 
the greatest supply gaps are visible and the most difficulties arise (due to 
the relatively larger capital resources required and risks involved). 
Therefore, developing a competitive construction industry should be an 
important objective of government policy. Firstly, governments should 
assign to a particular office the responsibility for promoting the 
development of the construction industry. Its tasks would ensure that 
fuller account of the industry is taken in the broader process of 
development planning; and would identify the problems and constraints of 
the industry and draw up a strategy to overcome them. In 
correspondence, contractors should be encouraged to set up a 
representative association which can serve as a channel for conducting a 
dialogue with the government and as an agent for taking joint action by 
the industry. Importantly, attention  needs to be paid to the effects of 
monetary and interest rate policies on the construction market and on 
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housing; to budgeting regulations that provide multi -year contracts and 
allow continuity of cash flow for them; to policy and legislation that can 
improve general government contracting practices and contract 
supervision procedures; to wage and employment policies that encourage 
a wider use of an under-employed or unemployed labor force; and to 
procedures for allocating and channeling foreign exchange that is required 
by the construction industry, especially for the procurement of spare 
parts. 
 Again, there is need for continuing to reform, update, and fine-tune 
regulations and procedures on pre-qualification, bidding, contracting, 
payments, building standards, land acquisition and land  titling, relevant 
customs procedures, uninterrupted flow of inputs and payments, etc. At 
the macroeconomic level, effort will be required to reduce or eliminate 
distortions in factor prices and interferences with the supply of factors of 
production. These distortions include monopolistic control of the supply of 
major materials and insufficient or delayed allocation of foreign exchange 
for purchase of spare parts. Other related issues include foreign exchange 
rate, import tariff regimes on equipment and regulations controlling the 
hiring and firing of labor and the wages as well as social security 
contributions. The government should also aim to achieve a greater 
understanding of the potential and needs of the informal sector of 
construction. And considering the labor-intensive and self-help nature of 
informal construction work, relatively minor financial inputs coupled with 
strong technical assistance support can produce a considerable impact. 
 However, given a country where there is a substantial gap between 
the services needed from the construction industry and their effective 
availability; and that this gap is likely to persists unless special measures 
are taken; and given the nature of the orchestrated actions, sustained 
over relatively long periods (which are required to develop the industry) 
success will largely depend on how interested and committed the 
authorities are to the development of an efficient, domestic capacity and 
how prepared they are to undertake difficult reforms of legislation and 
contracting procedures, as well as making a concentrated and sustained 
effort to help overcome problems (Constraints). Indeed, these challenges 
are demanding but promising with solutions of the 21
st
 century if 
adequately implemented).  
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10.0 CONCLUSION 
Indeed, a fundamental requirement of economic development is an 
adequate rate of capital formation relative to that of population 
expansion. Such capital formation is defined to include all expenditures of 
a productivity increasing nature; and it may take the form of investment 
in the public or the private sector. Here, the public investment is in the 
form of infrastructure and sets the framework for subsequent 
manufacturing investment whether public or private. Again, capital 
formation includes investment in human resources in the form of 
education and training as well as in physical assets. However, where 
human productivity is adversely affected by malnutrition and disease, 
increased food consumption and provision of sanitation and health 
facilities take on the aspect of investment in human capital. Thus, the use 
of resources for productivity-enhancing purposes may take a wide variety 
of forms, and the actual mix must be determined in the process of 
expenditure and resource planning. 
 It is therefore crucial that the fiscal system should play a multifold 
role in the process of economic development. Here, the level of taxation 
affects the level of public saving and hence the volume of resources 
available for capital formation. Again, both the level and the structure of 
taxation affect the level of private saving and public investment is needed 
to provide infrastructure types of investment. Similarly, a system of tax 
incentives and penalties may be designed to influence the efficiency of 
resource utilization; and the pattern of taxation on imports and exports 
relative to that of domestic products will affect the foreign trade balance. 
It is much less easy to prescribe a direct tax system which lives happily 
with both the theory and what is administratively  possible. Here, on 
exception would be a land tax out this is often ruled out for political 
reasons. Consequently corporate taxation is likely to remain a mainstay of 
taxation in developing countries. But the measurement of personal and 
small business income from any one source is extremely difficult, except 
for individuals whose occupations are entirely as employees in the more 
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formal sectors. Even there, fringe benefits and evasion can cause server 
problems. 
It is therefore futile to believe that domestic fiscal policy can 
perform the trick single handedly. Even on the basis of very optimistic 
assumptions regarding internal economic reform, most developing 
countries will continue to stagnate unless there is a substantial 
improvement in the quality of global economic management including 
timely and adequate support by donors for these reforms; settlement of 
political disputes and a breakthrough in relevant technologies (particularly 
in the agricultural sector). 
 Perhaps, the magnitude of government fiscal surplus or deficit is 
probably the single most important statistic in measuring the impact of 
government fiscal policy on the economy. And in view of its phenomenal 
growth, it is generally accepted that public sector finances and related 
policies constitute a central aspect of economic management, which partly 
influence overall macroeconomic performance  as well as  the distribution 
of resources between the public and private sectors. Therefore, there is a 
growing recognition that the formulation and implementation of 
macroeconomic management proposals and reforms must include wide- 
ranging fiscal reforms that will explicitly recognize the importance of 
deficit financing. In other words, the way government deficits are 
financed, taxes raised and public resources allocated and utilized have 
important consequences for economic growth. 
 In reality, fiscal adjustment towards a sustainable path can come 
through enhancing government revenues and policy-makers can improve 
non-oil revenue intake in order to expand the volume of resource available 
to government as well as reducing the vulnerability of public finances to 
commodity (oil) price shocks or movements. However, higher revenues 
will not help developing countries move towards fiscal sustainability if it 
draws attention and effort away from addressing expenditure issues along 
fiscal transparency and accountability in fact, it could have the pervasive 
effect of expanding government spending (and debt); and consequently 
moving the economy further away from its fiscal sustainability objectives. 
 Finally, the economic literature teaches us that there is one thing 
that a genuine reforming government can do to distinguish her from the 
lies that come from a weak government trying to disguise her. In other 
words, the genuine reformer needs to do something that the weak 
government is simply too frightened to do. That is, the genuine reformer 
is distinguished by courage and courage is (in economic parlance) that 
signal that separates the genuine reformer undertaking a transition from 
that of the weak government hoping to disguise her. Basically, this is the 
fiscal responsibility challenge of the 21
st
 century.   
 
 
 86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aaron, H. (1982) Economic Effects of social security, Washington: Brookings 
Institution 
 
Barro, R.J. (1989) “The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits” Journal of 
Economic perspectives Vol 3 No 2 37-54 
 
Bird, R.M. and O. Oliver (1990) (ed) Taxation in developing Countries, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press  
 
Blejer, M and A Cheasty (1991) “The Measurement of Fiscal Deficits: Analytical 
and Methodological issues”, Journal of Economic Literatures, Vol XXIX 
December, 1644-1678 
 
Boskin, M.J. (1982) “Federal Government Deficits: Some Myths and Realities”  
American Economic Review, May pp 296-303 
 
Brennan, G. and J.M. Buchanan (1980) The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations 
of Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Briltain, J. (1972) The Payroll Tax for Social Security, Washington: Brookings 
Institution. 
 
Broadway, R.S et al (1994) “The Reform of Fiscal system in developing and 
emerging market economies: A Federalism Perspective”, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 1259 
 
Buiter, W. (1983) “Measurement of the Public Sector Deficit and its implications 
for policy Evaluation and Design”, International Monetary Funds Staff 
Papers., June 30 (2) Pp 306-49 
 
Burgress, R and N sterm (1993) ‘Taxation and Development”, Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol. XXXI (June) 762-830 
 87 
 
Central Bank (2003) Issues in Fiscal Management: Implications for Monetary 
Policy in Nigeria, Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria. 
 
Central Bank (2006) Statistical Bulleting,  Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)  
 
Chelliah, R.J. (1973) “Significance of Alternative concepts of Budget Deficit.” 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Nov. 20(3), PP 741-84. 
 
Clark, C. (1940) The conditions of economic progress, London: Macmillan 
 
Collier, P. and J.W. Gunning (1997) “Explaining African Economic Performance”, 
Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVII (March) 64-111 
 
Darrat, A.F. (1989) “Fiscal Deficits and Long-term interest Rates: Further 
Evidence from Annual Data”, Southern Economic Journal October, 363-
74. 
 
Davoodi, H., and H. Zon (1998) “Fiscal decentralization and Economic Growth”, 
Journal of Urban Economics, 43-244-257 
 
 
Dreze, J. and A.K Sen (1989) Hunger and Public Action, Oxford: Clarendon press 
 
Ekpo, A.H. (1994) “Fiscal Federalism. Nigeria’s Post-Independence Experience, 
World Development 22 (81) August 
 
Elbadawi, I.A et. Al (1992) “Why structural Adjustment has not succeeded in 
sub-Saharan Africa”, World Bank Policy Research Paper 1000  (October) 
 
Gilbert, C.L. (1987) “International Commodity Agreements. Design and 
performance”, World Development, Vol 15 No 5 591-616 
 
Gulhati, R. (1990) “Who makes Economic Policy in Africa and how?” World 
Development Vol. 18 No 8 PP 1147 – 1161 
 
Ghufa, D and M.T. Hadjimichael (1996) “Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, IMF 
Staff Paper,  Vol. 43 No 3 (September) 
 
Harberger, A.C. (1959) “The corporation Income Tax: An Empirical Appraisal” 
Tax Revision Compendium I 
 
Harberger, A.C. (1962) The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax”, Journal of 
Political Economy 70, 215-40 
 88 
 
Harberger, A.C. (1966) “Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital in M. 
Kizyzaniak (ed.) Effect of Corporation Income Tax, Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press 
 
International Monetary Fund (1993) Balance of Payments Manual, Washington: 
IMF 
 
Johnston, B.F. and J.W. Mellor (1961) “The Role of Agriculture in economic 
development”, American Economic Review, 51: 566-593 
 
Klein, T.M. (1994) “External Debt Management. An Introduction, World Bank 
Technical Paper number 245 
Kuznets, S. (1966) Modern Economic Growth, New Haven; Yale University Press  
 
Lucas, R. (1988) “On the mechanics of economic development”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol 22 pp3-42 
 
Morrison, T.K. (1982) “Structural Determinants of Government Budget Deficits in 
Developing Countries”, World Development, Vol. 10 No. 6 pp 467-4 
 
Mosher, A.T. (1966) Getting agriculture moving: Essential for development and 
modernization, New York: Praeger 
 
Muller, P and R. R. Price (1984) “Structural Budget Deficits and fiscal stance”, 
OECD Economics and statistics Department Working Papers, July (15) 
 
Musgrave, R. and P. Musgrave (1984) Public Finance in theory and Practice. New 
York: McGraw- Hill. 
 
Nwaobi, G.C. (2000) The Knowledge Economics: Trends and Perspective, Lagos 
Goan Communication Press.  
 
  
Nwaobi, G.C. (2004) “Corruption and bribery in the Nigeria Economy: An 
empirical Investigation”, Social Science Research Network Paper 
http://ssm.com/abstract=531402 Com/abstract = 531402 
 
Oates, W.E. (1972) Fiscal Federalism, New York: Jovanovich 
 
Onah, F.E. (2006) (ed.) Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria, Nsukka: Great Express 
Publishers 
 
 89 
Oslon, M. (1969) “The Principles of Fiscal Equivalence: The Division of 
Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government”, American 
Economic Review 59 (2) 479-87 
 
Otani, I and D. Villanueva (1990) Long-Term Growth in developing Countries and 
its determinants: An empirical analysis, World Development, Vol. 18 No 
6 PP 769-783 
 
Oyovbaire, S.E. (1985) Federalism in Nigeria, London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
 
Premchard, A (1989) Government Budgeting and Expenditure Controls: Theory 
and Practice, Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Ranis, G. (1990) “Asian and Latin American Experience: Lessons for Africa”, 
Journal of International development, Vol 2 No 2 April PP 151-171 
 
Rasheed, M.A. (1995) “Foreign Exchange Management in Nigeria”, Central Bank 
of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review, Vol 33 No 4 Pp 352- 356 
 
Roe, A.R and J. Griggs (1990) “Internal Debt Management in Africa”, AERC 
Special Paper 4 (Feb) 
 
Schuh, G.E. (1976) “The new Macroeconomics of Agriculture, American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 58, 802-811  
 
Shoven, J.B. and J. Whalley (1972) “A General Equilibrium calculation of the 
Effects of Differential Taxation of Income from Capital in the United 
State”, Journal of Public Economics, 281-322. 
 
Shoven, J.B (1976) “The Incidence and Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income 
from Capital”, Journal of Political Economy 84, 1261-83 
 
Singh, I. Et al (1986) “A Survey of Agricultural Household Models: Recent finding 
and Policy Implications”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol 1 No 1 (149-
179) 
 
Tanzi, V. (1977) “Inflation, lags in collection, and the Real value of tax Revenue, 
International Monetary Fund staff papers March 24 (1) PP 154-67 
 
Tanzi, V (1982) “Fiscal Disequilibrium in Developing countries”, World 
Development. Dec Pp 1069-82 
 
Tella, S.A. (2007) “Overview of External Reserves Management in Nigeria”, 
Central Bank of Nigeria Bullion, Vol 31 No 2 
 90 
 
Timmer, P.C. (1988) “The Agricultural Transformation”, in H. Chenery and T.N. 
Srinivasan (ed.) Handbook of Development Economics, Belgium; Elsevier 
Science Publishers 
 
World Bank (1984) The Construction Industry: Issues and Strategies in 
Developing countries, Washington: World Bank 
 
World Bank (1992) Model Building: RMSM-X-Reference  Guide, Washington: The 
Economists Work Station Project Training Series. 
 
World Bank (1995) “Nigeria: Agricultural Pricing Policy” World Bank Technical 
Report 4945 
 
World Bank (2002) A Source book for poverty reduction strategies, Washington: 
World Bank. 
 
World Bank (2003) World Development Indicators, Washington: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2007) African Development Indicator, Washington: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2008) World Development Report, Washington: World Bank 
 
Yellen, J.L. (1989) “Symposium on the Budget Deficit”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol 3 (2) 
 
Zahid, K.H. (1988) “Government Budget Deficits and Interest Rates: The 
Evidence Since 1971 using Alternative Deficit Measures” Southern 
Economic Journal, Jan, 725-31. 
